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PREFACE 
This dissertation makes no grand claims for the final truth involving 
the study of rhetoric. In fact, I question to what extent it is innovative, 
insightful, or original. Much of what follows stands on the rich heritage of 
our discipline; my role, primarily, is to review the long history of rhetoric 
and to remind my readers that we do indeed reinvent the wheel at every 
turn. As my rhetoric professor, Dr. Batteiger, once said, "composition 
has a history, but no memory." This observation broadly serves as the 
foundation for this study. It also humbles me. If I bring to this work any 
advantages that the young guns of academia--those razor sharp minds 
full of new-found theory--do not have, it is this: age and experience. In 
the high noon of life, and with twenty-something teaching years under 
my belt, I know that what goes around comes around. I have been in 
the business long enough to have hit the second wave of what was 
thought to be the tempests of new theories that, in retrospect, were 
ripples of thought that come and go with the current of time. 
Presently, and perhaps as always, confusion reigns supreme in our 
discipline. What is our subject matter? How should it be taught? Who 
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should teach it? Answers are as varied as the number of people asking 
them. Read any journal, attend any conference, and talk with any two 
English teachers and ample evidence exists as to the theoretical swamp 
we find ourselves in. At a recent English conference I attended, diversity 
prevailed. Sessions ranged from 11Cultural Diversity, 11 to 'Women's 
Studies," to "Correct Writing. 11 To add to the confusion, other fields seem 
to be "invading our territory, 11 fields such as psychology, sociology, 
linguistics, and business. Rhetoric, it would seem, has no proper subject 
matter. 
I contend, however, that despite the proliferation of theories and the 
confusion they have wrought in some areas, certain rhetorical principles 
remain unchanged. Despite how we twist our discipline to fit any 
number of aims, rhetoric, as defined by Aristotle, is as relevant now as it 
was in ancient times: 
Rhetoric is the faculty of discovering 
in the particular case all the available 
means of persuasion. It has no special · 
subject matter (Cooper xxxvii). 
Lane Cooper's translation of Aristotle lays further groundwork for the 
purpose of rhetoric in discussing the difference between "inart,istic11 and 
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11artistic11 proofs. Inartistic proofs are external to the persuasion: 
11witnesses, confessions, and contracts are external to the art of 
speaking11 (xxxvii). In contemporary terms, inartistic writing may also 
include the kind of voiceless prose that supposes an understood writer 
11outside11 the piece, as well as the kind of prose where the writer is 
previously known by the audience. In either case the reader can make 
certain assumptions without any real sense of 11realizing 11 the writer. The 
argument, as it were, is known prior to the reading. 
But of greater importance to contemporary writing is Aristotle's idea 
of 11artistic11 proof. With artistic proofs, the writer must invent his own 
methods of appeal, independent from any outside point of reference. 
Most writers, lacking the benefit of a reputation that precedes them, must 
create their own 11artistic11 proofs, or, as in the case of the voiceless prose 
of the bureaucracy, cause such proofs to hover above the piece 
unchallenged because of the very aim of the discourse, as in contracts, 
policies, and manuals. Not having reputations nor desiring voiceless 
prose, writers must invent from within their texts their own available 
means of persuasion, as Cooper states, by 11evincing through the speech 
a personal character that will win over the confidence of the listener; 
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engaging the listener's emotions; [and by] proving a truth ... by argument11 
(xxxviii). We have, in other words, three means of artistic proofs: ethos, 
pathos, and logos. 
Of these three proofs I have chosen ethos as my topic for this 
dissertation. Although other areas within rhetoric are worthy of study 
(certainly pathos and logos deserve renewed attention), and although 
Aristotle's larger framework of rhetoric comprising invention, 
arrangement, and style renders indefinite new possibilities for study, I 
nonetheless maintain that ethos is the essential foundation for the study 
of rhetoric. With this assertion, I will clarify and categorize the role of 
ethos as it was established and as it has evolved from classical rhetoric 
through deconstruction. 
This survey will first introduce the general status of ethos in 
contemporary rhetoric. I will next establish the classical roots of 
ethos as they were established in the works of Aristotle, Plato, 
Quintilian, and Cicero. I will then trace these roots to modern rhetoric, 
particularly as they appear in post-1963 rhetoric, arguing in 
the process that during the period 1875-1963 ethos had disappeared. 
Additionally, I will comment on the role of ethos in deconstruction. Also, 
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I will include a chapter on pedagogical applications of projecting ethos in 
expository composition. And finally, I will conclude my study with some 
observations about the future directions of our discipline. 
My overall objective, throughout this study, is to reestablish the firm 
foundation upon which rhetoric is built: the foundation of self. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Where's the Ethos? 
I celebrate myself, and sing myself 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you 
Walt Whitman 
I sit on this warm May day in my office at Northern Oklahoma 
College, petrified at the screen that lies blank before me. Struggling, I 
type one word at a time in my attempt to write the most important paper 
of my life, the significance of which paralyzes my thoughts. But plunge 
on I will, and if my readers will bear with me, they may come away 
knowing something they didn't know when they started. At the least, I 
promise the readers will get a strong dose of my own ethos. 
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Like every writer, I want to be heard. This desire, though, demands 
that I rise to the occasion to which I speak, that I present myself credibly 
to a community of scholars who know well my topic, and that my 
consciousness, inhibited, will ultimately turn outward where we together 
may arrive at a new understanding of ethos. For now, as Peter Elbow 
suggests in his Writing With Power, I am "closing my eyes as I speak" 
(50). Before I hone in on the specifics of my paper, I would like first to 
discuss the general status of our profession today, for to pluck ethos 
from the vastness of rhetoric is to distort its central role in the 
epistemological evolution of its significance in Composition pedagogy (I 
attribute the upper-case 11C11 to Stephen North). 
The year 1963 marks the birth of composition as we know it today. 
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The 1963 CCCC, attended by Wayne Booth, Edward P.J.Corbett, Francis 
Christensen, Richard Young, Richard Larson, Ross Winterowd, and 
numerous others, changed the course of the way we viewed 
composition. Before 1963 and the explosion of research that ensued, 
writing was relegated to the basement$ of English departments where 
underqualified teaching assistants, without methodology, would hack 
away the best they could. Composition had no proper subject matter, as 
Aristotle once said about rhetoric. A student of that era, I remember the 
fog called Comp I where I wrote in the darkness of having no subject, 
purpose, or audience. I wrote mindlessly and weeks would pass 
before my papers were returned with one mark: a circled letter grade. 
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I remember, though, the difference a few years made. In the late 
1960's I reluctantly enrolled in a rhetoric course taught by an English 
professor. His approach was Christensen's generative rhetoric. For the 
first time, someone taught me how to write, how to craft my sentences, 
and how to subordinate my thoughts. I became an English major after 
that course. Then, in graduate school, I encountered a hard-nosed 
Director of Composition who insisted upon the mastery of James 
Kinneavy's triangle and Booth's stance. Suddenly, writing had reference 
and purpose, a concreteness upon which I could hang my ideas. 
Armed now with structure, the triangle, and the stance, I was well 
on my way to generating prose with some confidence and a modicum of 
mastery. Equally important, the CCCC conference of 1963 provided 
insight into the teaching of our discipline. 
But something was still missing. Where's the ethos? At a 1990 
Southwest Regional Conference of English, I listened to a speaker 
talk about "engagement.'' To me the term sounded squishy, a rehash of 
the mid-sixties expressionistic writing that wreaked havoc under the guise 
of poetic license, under what Edward P.J. Corbett terms "creative self-
expression [before] the student had a self to express and a facility for 
expressing it" (xi). This speaker, though, seemed different and his 
message made sense. In the triangular scheme of composition, he 
maintained, novice writers invariably emphasize the content, ignoring in 
the process any notion of self or audience, or ethos and pathos. He 
further claimed that even experienced writers tend to refrain from 
projecting themselves as people writing to people. 
This observation triggered my thinking. I have long noticed that 
student writing is largely barren of any sense of self. Rarely do I see an 
111, 11 personal narratives, or a personal perspective of any sort. I went 
back to Booth and Kinneavy and reconsidered the triangle and the 
stance. In Booth's conceptual framework, writers must situate 
themselves in the writer's stance: subject, purpose, and audience. With 
Kinneavy, writers must situate themselves within a triangle: ethos, logos, 
and pathos. 
Booth and Kinneavy made solid contributions to the teaching of 
writing. However, problems arise. Pixton notes that 11the triangle 
provides little information about how writers vary the emphases on the 
components (writer, audience, reality, and text) during the writing 
process, and about how they determine the existing distribution of 
4 
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emphases" (263). As Booth suggests, the writer's stance must balance 
itself with the communications triangle--a balance that is precarious for 
most writers. Collapsing from any angle, the stance is skewed: ethos 
exclusively results in an "entertainer's" stance; pathos exclusively results 
in the "advertiser's" stance; and logos exclusively results in the "pedant's" 
stance (142). As Kinneavy suggests, the writer's framework balances on 
a triangle of classical origin, specifically Aristotle's ethos, logos, or 
pathos. With these proofs in mind, I could better see the distortions that 
surface in composition. Ironically, most writers assume the pedantic 
stance, emphasizing logos as the mainstay of their composition. 
Distance and objectivity distinguish the bulk of writing where the writer 
disappears in vapors of third-person pronouns, passive voice, 
and cold, stilted prose announced by the infamous phrase "in today's 
modern society." 
My question remains: where's the ethos? Some of the 
pedagogical practices of the mid 1960's stressed ethos to the point of 
poetic expression, an expression void of audience and subject. 
According to Corbett, a kind of "closed fist" rhetoric dominated the 
1960's that was characterized as _"gregarious, coercive, and non-
conciliatory" (vii). Corbett goes on to say that writers, "instead of 
attempting to ingratiate themselves with an audience, deliberately 
attempt to shock, to exasperate, even to alienate an audience" (vii). 
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Ethos in the 1960's was exploited as a vehicle for protest. Writing 
teachers, responding to this political agenda, promoted ethos to the 
exclusion of subject or audience. Or, to the extreme of political activism, 
writers were encouraged to express a sort of nothingness under the 
guise of self-expression. Bizarre assignments--11describe the sound of 
one hand clapping" or "describe clouds and their symbolic relationship to 
the writer"-- illustrate such meaningless prose. 
Rhetorical schools of thought had no classification. Teachers, 
consequently, taught without an awareness of a rhetorical conceptual 
framework. 
James Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class 11 provides 
such a classification. These useful classifications that place schools of 
rhetorical thought in perspective include the following: cognitive rhetoric, 
expressionistic rhetoric, and social-epistemic rhetoric. Furthermore, 
within his classifications, the issue of ethos becomes paramount in his 
discussion of ideology. According to Berlin, 11rhetoric is regarded as 
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always already ideological.'' and therefore 11a rhetoric can never be 
innocent" (477). The implications of these premises are vast. Within 
Berlin's classifications, writers bring forth their values in composition, and 
these values must be reflected in their ethos. Berlin does not advocate, 
however, that we embrace ethos to the exclusion of audience or subject. 
Instead, he places ideology within these three broad appeals and implies 
that such classification clarifies the writer's ethical role. Though his 
distinctions defy neat chronological order, Berlin maintains that we 
currently stress cognitive rhetoric, a science-based discourse that has 
roots in current-traditional rhetoric and its Aristotelian foundation (a 
foundation that time has distorted, as I will show in Chapter Three). 
Berlin further states in 11Rhetoric and Ideology," that 11current traditional 
rhetoric with its positivistic epistemology and its pretentions to scientific 
precision" dominated nineteenth-century rhetoric (481). Additionally, 
"cognitive rhetoric has made similar claims to being scientific" (481). 
Berlin's definition of cognitive rhetoric closely resembles Richard 
Young's definition of current-traditional rhetoric. Richard Young's 
definition is useful: 
The emphasis [is] on the composed product 
rather than the composition process; the 
analysis of discourse into words, sentences, 
and paragraphs; the classification of dis-
course into description, narration, expo-
sition, and argument; the strong concern 
with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation) 
and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis) 
(qtd.in Berlin, 11Current-Traditional Rhetoric ... 11 1). 
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With these emphases, the writer's ethos is clearly diminished (perhaps to 
almost total self-effacement) in the name of disinterested scientism. 
In addition to Berlin's points about cognitive rhetoric, Berlin 
discusses expressionistic rhetoric. He defines it as a mode of discourse 
where, in its extreme form, the 11existent is located within the individual 
subject11 ("Rhetoric and ldeology11 484). The aim of this mode is to view 
rhetoric as an art, as a "creative act in which the process--the discovery 
of the true self--is as important as the product" (484). With roots in Plato, 
this rhetorical school blossomed in the 1960's with proponents like Ken 
Macrorie, Walker Gibson, Donald Murray, and Peter Elbow. Arguably, to 
a fault, ethos became the sole domain of rhetoric. No longer 
constrained by the conventions of standard English or inhibited by the 
dictates of current-traditional rhetoric, writers were free to explore and 
express their inner feelings without the constraining influence of an 
audience peering over their shoulder. In other words, expressionistic 
writing neglected the reader. 
Ethos thus balances between the ideological neutrality of a 
scientific, external reality and the value-laden subjectivity of an internal 
reality as perceived differently by each writer. On the one hand, the 
writer almost vanishes amid the facts and calculations of 
the text. On the other hand, the writer is all there is. These extremes 
demonstrate, for now, the polarities of objectivity and subjectivity that 
generally distinguish composition. 
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Berlin does, however, in "Rhetoric and Ideology," advocate a 
compromise of sorts in his discussion of what he calls social-epistemic 
rhetoric. Not objective, not subjective, this rhetoric, as the name implies, 
involves an interaction between writer and reader and is epistemological 
in that it generates knowledge as "an area of ideological conflict .... [that] 
supports economic, social, political, and cultural democracy" (489). 
Ethos within this context, though, demands that writers know their values 
relative to their culture's values. Basic to this knowledge are three 
questions Berlin raises: 'What exists? What is good? And what is 
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possible?" (479). Though such questions undoubtedly stimulate writers' 
thinking, and though such questions may reveal writers' ideology, I have 
found that the depth of these questions digs a deep hole that buries the 
best of writers, blurring, rather than clarifying, their ethos. Novice writers 
frequently lack the sophistication of thought needed for this type of 
introspective writing. 
Berlin's middle ground of social epistemic rhetoric, as discussed in 
"Current Traditional Rhetoric: Paradigm and Practice," places ethos as 
derivative of the writer's strong sense of self--intellectually, politically, and 
culturally. Unlike the diminished role of ethos in current-traditional 
rhetoric where "the thesis exists outside the writer ... rather than something 
that grows internally," ethos in the social-epistemic sphere of thinking is 
the reflection of a sophisticated mind (4). This emphasis sharply differs 
from the ethical considerations of classical rhetoric as defined primarily 
by Aristotle and Plato and also differs from the creative considerations of 
expressionistic rhetoric where "truth" is relative to the individual. 
Such positioning, however noble, may be too ideal and beyond the 
grasp of most writers. Though I agree that writers must discover and 
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express their "ideological claims" (Berlin, "Rhetoric and Ideology" 4 77), 
writers at any level must begin developing their ethos in more 
fundamental, practical ways. Linda Flower's influential writer-based 
prose approach espouses ethos as the foundation of writing. Like Berlin, 
and like the advocates of expressionistic rhetoric, Flower maintains that 
writers must be at the center of composition. But Flower does not 
endorse the loftiness of Berlin and the creativity of expressionism; 
instead, she sees ethos more as a developmental technique that 
motivates writers to go beyond "the simple act of self- expression" (19). 
Though steeped in psychological language, Flower views the 
development of ethos (Flower never uses this term) as a cognitive stage 
in the writing process. Stating that communication is "egocentric" (20), 
Flower contends that writer-based prose begins the natural development 
of writing that must ultimately "transform to a reader-based prose" (20). 
The point here is that in contemporary rhetoric two extremes of 
ethos surface, both similar in placing ethos at the center of composition, 
but diametrically opposite in their purpose. With Berlin 
and fellow advocates of a social-epistemic rhetoric, as well as advocates 
of expressionistic rhetoric, ethos .exists for writers to discover. Knowing 
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"competing versions of reality" (Berlin, "Rhetoric and Ideology" 477), 
these writers enter the rhetorical ·arena armed with a strong sense of their 
identity and with the implied confidence to express it. With Flower and 
fellow advocates of cognitive rhetoric, ethos is a method of discovery, of 
"verbal expression written by a writer to himself and for himself1 (19). 
The difference is significant: ethos in social"'.epistemic, and, to a lesser 
degree in expressionistic rhetoric, projects an ethical portrait, more 
consciously than not, to a reader. Ethos in cognitive rhetoric reflects, 
more subconsciously than not, the emerging personality of the writer 
without regard to readers. For Flower, ethos is practical; for Berlin, ethos 
is ethical. 
Thus far, I have summarized the current status of ethos in 
contemporary rhetoric, and in doing so I have no doubt suggested 
through unintended digressions and ambiguity the extreme difficulty 
of defining precisely its terms or purpose. Prior to the rhetorical 
revolution of 1963, ethos remained a diminished aspect of the classical 
pisteis, surrendering its impact to the appeals of pathos and logos. 
Under the broad classification of current-traditional rhetoric that has 
dominated rhetorical theory since. the late nineteenth century, ethos has 
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been largely situated 11outside11 in an external, positivistic, science-
oriented realm of perception. In Berlin's phrase, in current-traditional 
rhetoric, ethos was "out there" since the inception of English composition 
at Harvard in 1875 ("Current-Traditional Rhetoric ... 11 3). 
With Kinneavy's ''The Basic Aims of Discourse, 11 Booth's ''The 
Rhetorical Stance, 11 Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class, 11 
Flower's 'Writer-Based Prose, 11 and numerous other rhetorical theories 
that have flourished since the revolution of 1963, ethos has perhaps 
reclaimed the prominence given it in classical rhetoric, where its position, 
as Nan Johnson asserts, was that of an "integral force of cultural 
cohesion [which affected] changing attitudes in western society" (114). 
propose that ethos has regained in the past thirty years a more dominant 
role than it has been given under the influence of current-traditional 
rhetoric. 
The purpose of this study is not, however, to quibble over 
ideological differences that separate current-traditionalists from 
expressionists from 11new rhetoricians" from poststructuralists. Within 
these schools more similarities exist than differences. We tend to 
reinvent the wheel at every turn . .Nor does this study promise any 
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definitive and final solution to the "proper" role of ethos in contemporary 
rhetoric. I stand humbly on the broad shoulders of those who have 
devoted their lives to advancing the field of rhetoric to the discipline that 
it has become today: an emerging force that is defining its own proper 
subject matter. 
Rather, the purpose of this study is to analyze classical, modern, 
and poststructural rhetoric in terms of classifying the role of ethos in 
each of these broad areas. My analysis will involve primarily the distance 
between writer and reader within each period discussed. And from this 
discussion, I will distinguish between character and personality as these 
traits pertain to ethos. Based on this analysis I will explain ethos and its 
pedagogical applications to the freshman composition course. 
In attempting to situate the role of ethos in contemporary rhetoric, I 
find it necessary to survey its significance in the three 
broad areas that I have identified. In this effort, Chapter Two discusses 
ethos as defined by classical rhetoricians, with Aristotle and Plato the 
locus of my discussion. Their definitions, antithetical 
in most respects, serve both as a foundation and a framework from 
which any discussion of ethos emanates. I will further cite Quintilian's 
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and Cicero's contributions to the refinement of ethos. Additionally, I will 
discuss the contemporary interpretations of classical ethos in the works 
of Corbett, Yoos, Lunsford and Ede, Crowley, Johnson, and others. 
Central to my discussion of classical ethos is the moral character 
projected by the writer as either instilled or created, ideal or real. 
Chapter Three discusses ethos from a modern perspective. Post 
current-traditional in its emphasis, this chapter details the 
influence of Kinneavy, Booth, Christensen, Young, Elbow, Larson, Berlin, 
Corder, and a host of others who comprise The New Rhetoric (a slippery 
term) that emphasizes, among other significant issues, the role of ethos 
in contemporary rhetoric. 
Pivotal here is the shift from objective standards of classical morality 
("absolute" in Plato's case) to the more subjective, ideological definitions 
that writers bring to the text. Morality, or ethics, becomes less a concern 
than the ''voice" projected from an individual writer. At the risk of 
over-generalizing and over-simplifying, I contend that the writer's ethos 
as an extension of a personality takes precedence over the more 
classical sense of character. 
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Chapter Four discusses the role of ethos in post-
structural rhetoric. Though I have written at some length in this 
present chapter about the revolution of composition that began at the 
CCCC in 1963, there was a second revolution that took place at Johns 
Hopkins University in 1966, which introduced to America, among others, 
Roland Barthes, Michael Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. Ethos, at best, 
becomes ethereal; at worst, it dies: "the modern text ... is read in such a 
way that at all its levels the author is absent'' (Barthes 143). For 
Foucault, the author "disappears" and is "outside" the text; the point is 
reduced to the question, "what matter who's speaking?" (193). 
Influenced in large part by the existential angst of Nietzsche, 
poststructural rhetoric is ambiguous in its treatment of ethos. Though 
Barthes makes clear distinctions between "writerly" (ethos) and "readerly" 
(pathos) prose, much of poststructural rhetorical theory is murky on the 
issue of ethos. As Jane Tompkins notes, poststructuralists deny that 
writing has ''free-standing subjects, free-standing objects, or a 
free-standing method" (734). Whether or not poststructural theory and its 
insights on ethos will alter the course of composition remains to be seen. 
I continue in Chapter Five with some pedagogical applications of 
the writer's projection of ethos in composition. Contained in this 
discussion are classical and contemporary considerations of the 
distinctions between ethos and ethics. I have included in this chapter 
student samples of writing that I have collected in my classes this year. 
I conclude in Chapter Six with a summation of the three major 
classifications discussed in this paper: ethos is located in classical, 
modern, and poststructural rhetoric. And I also comment on the future 
directions that ethos occupies in freshman composition. 
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Chapter II 
Classical Rhetoric: Voices from the Past 
Rhetoric is a strategic art which facilitates 
decisions in civil matters and accepts the 
appearance of goodness as sufficient to 
inspire conviction 
Aristotle 
(Johnson 98) 
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The supreme object of a man's efforts in public 
and private life must be the reality rather than 
the appearance of goodness 
Plato 
(Johnson 99) 
Some sage once said that we are either Aristotelian or Platonic in 
our thinking. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a general 
framework that connects classical and contemporary rhetoric. Aristotle, 
of the two, is far more direct and practical in his discussion of ethos. 
Defining ethos as the speaker's ability to "evince through the speech a 
personal character that will win the confidence of the listener," Aristotle 
establishes the foundation of ethos (Cooper xxxvii). This foundation 
invites contemporary interpretations as to differences between character 
and personality. 
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These modern interpretations, from my perspective, include 
numerous dichotomies--real and perceived; practical and ideal; genuine 
and feigned--all suggestive of what I have referred to as character and 
personality. If ethos is, as Aristotle says, the most potent proof in ) 
discourse, and if ethos is the 11evincing11 of a particular self to an 
audience, writers must struggle with their projection of self, or, at the very 
least, be aware of the differences between character and personality. 
These terms, I suggest, are not synonymous, and at the crux of this 
dichotomy lies the essence of ethos as defined by Aristotle and Plato. 
Aristotle implies that character is a matter of the appearance of 
moral excellence, and that such an appearance has specific attributes 
that are directly linked to audience. Ethos, or the self, can or cannot be 
sincere. Essential to Aristotle is the idea that rhetoric is a means of 
persuasion, a pragmatic strategy, that draws from the audience the 
desired response--the aim of the discourse, as Kinneavy claims. 
Does Aristotle's pragmatic strategy distort the distinction between 
ethos and ethics? Might ethos be defined as personality 
and ethics as character? Is ethos, as Aristotle implies, a morally 
neutral term that feigns the virtues he lists as they relate to character? 
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George Yoos, in his "A Revision of the Concept of Ethical Appeal," 
asserts that we have "mixed up" the distinction, and, as a result, we have 
reduced the "important differences and distinctions among moral, 
immoral, and non-moral appeals [that] are altogether ignored in 
discussions of ethical appeal" (41). Further stating that Aristotle's 
rhetoric "invites pretense" and that his emphasis is on "feigned ethos, 11 
Yoos proposes that we put ethics back into -ethos (41). 
Although Yoos raises a noble question, such inquiry perhaps better 
belongs in the realm of religion or philosophy. Aristotle, to my 
understanding, does not promote a theological or philosophic position, 
but instead offers rhetoric as a practical strategy of persuading people. 
In this sense, Aristotle's ethos is a neutral, not moral, term. Such a 
distinction is important as I lay the framework for contemporary rhetoric, 
and ethos' central role in it. 
Within this discussion of the connections between classical and 
contemporary rhetoric, I must first give credit to Dr.Batteiger's 
comment that "composition has a history, but no memory." Though our 
discipline has firm roots in its two-thousand-year history, students of 
composition--! am included here-~tend to view contemporary issues 
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isolated from their original sources. Pedagogically amnesic, we awaken. 
each day to engage in what Stephen North has generally discussed as 
being a kind of "methodological warfare, 11 a fight to stake our claim in 
what would seem to be the new territory called composition. 
We are, it seems, in a state of confusion regarding recent theories, 
textbooks, and language about pre-writing, writing, and revision. 
Brainstorming, mapping, free-writing, and the pentad enjoy popular 
currency. Standard organization with its emphasis on an introduction 
that ends with a thesis, a main body that supports that 
thesis, and a conclusion that reasserts that thesis appears in most 
textbooks. And expression, the elusive quality of effective writing, comes 
in many guises--from the exactitude of grammatical correctness, to the 
strength of clarity and conciseness, or to the eloquence of tropes that 
tap with poetic meter. 
All of this confusion is over a battle that has already been fought. 
In summary, these basic concerns fall under what has become 
Aristotle's triad of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, and style. As 
Corbett shows in his 1965 landmark text Classical Rhetoric for the 
Modern Student, composition can be taught without some of the current, 
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confusing methodologies. Contrasting the old style of rhetorical activity 
( 11the open hand'? with the new style (11the closed fist11), Corbett implies 
that the old style is the best style (vii). He proceeds to caution modern 
writers who fail to follow the precepts set forth by Aristotle: 
No system, classical or modern, has been 
devised that can change students suddenly 
and irrevocably into masters of elegant 
prose, but the ancient teachers of rhetoric, 
refus[ed] to be impressed by the notion of 
creative self-expression until the student 
had a self to express and a facility for 
expressing it (xi). 
Conservative and rigorous, Corbett wrote the definitive text that 
asserts the classical value of modern rhetoric. 
For the most part, though, these contemporary clarifications 
address general rhetorical principles, precepts that discuss the aims of 
discourse in terms of invention, arrangement, and style. Though Aristotle 
spoke at length about the role of ethos in rhetoric, time might have 
misinterpreted his discussion of the importance of character in 
composition. 
A similar fate of misinterpretation has befallen Plato. Though he, 
like his student Aristotle, espoused the essence of ethos, time has both 
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dimmed and distorted his central ideas on the subject. Plato believed in 
absolute goodness, an ethereal quality that self-destructs because mere 
mortals cannot obtain it. Therefore, writers attempting to espouse the 
principles of Plato find themselves in an intellectual quicksand where 
they are swallowed up. The contemporary theories of Elbow, Ken 
Macrorie, Richard Larson, and, to a lesser degree, Booth and 
Christensen have roots in Plato's theories. 
Based on these ideas, the purpose of this chapter is to clarify 
misinterpretations involving ethos from its origins in classical thought. By 
including the distinctions between Aristotle and Plato, I would hope that 
rhetoricians could clarify their philosophies concerning the teaching of 
composition. 
Whether Aristotelian or Platonic in our thinking, such classification 
will provide a conceptual framework in which I will discuss the classical 
roots of ethos. In addition to the differing definitions given by Aristotle 
and Plato, I will also include the ideas of Quintilian and Cicero that 
closely align themselves to their predecessors, though with noteworthy 
distinctions. 
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My intent throughout this study is to discuss ethos as it pertains to 
character and personality, and as it has evolved from classical times to 
the present. In doing so, I owe some debt to Hong Uu's master's thesis 
entitled ''The Semantics of Old and New Rhetorical Terminology: A Close 
Examination of Ethos," which examines ethos as "anchored by normative 
and utilitarian poles" (4). In her examination of ethos, Liu concludes that 
ethos, per se, has not substantively changed since its inception in the 
classical works. She contends that, though various definitions of ethos 
have evolved over time, the semantics of the term remain much the 
same. Her conclusion, given the framework of normative (ideal) and 
utilitarian (practical) extremes, is that ethos has shifted from an ideal to a 
practical expression of self. Liu implies that "environmental changes" and 
''technology" have contributed to a "downfall of rhetoric" (1), that 
normative aims have given way to utilitarian aims, though in cases the 
two overlap. Though I generally agree with this thesis, I maintain that 
ethos as an expression of self is largely determined by its ideological 
purpose, by its expression of character, or by its expression of 
personality. 
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These distinctions that I believe constitute the essence of ethos as 
determined by the ability of the writer to reach the reader go beyond 
what Larson calls 11the penchant for dividing discourse into kinds and 
classes that theorists and teachers of rhetoric have displayed in the last 
two centuries" (203). Though I am aware, of course, that what I propose 
in this study is yet another method of classification, I am convinced that 
the core of composition, from classical rhetoric to modern discourse, is 
rooted in the 11expressive11 apex of Kinneavy's communication triangle. As 
Larson suggests, "among those less well known [methods of 
classification] is one that classifies discourse as 'subjective' and 
'objective'" (204). Larson further states that "this principle of division also 
holds that pieces of discourse are either made up primarily of details to 
the senses and direct interpretations of those data, or primarily of 
ratiocinative constructs" (205). In other words, as I interpret this division, 
the "interpretive" approach involves the writer's personality, while the 
"ratiocinative" approach involves the writer's character. Ideology, values, 
and perception by their nature pervade the personality realm of ethos; 
logic, reason, and conception by their nature pervade the 
character realm of ethos. In saying this, however, I must make clear that 
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I am not displacing ethos with logos, especially as my distinction applies 
to the objective realm. This focus remains within the apex of the 
11expressive11 corner of the communications triangle. From whichever 
perspective, writers express themselves as they transcribe their versions 
of reality. 
For Aristotle, the primary purpose of rhetoric was to persuade, and 
to use 11all the available means11 to do so. These means include the 
presentation of self as being 11just, courageous, liberal, temperate, 
magnanimous, sagacious, magnificent, gentle, and wise" (Cooper 47). 
For Plato, who was ambiguous and paradoxical in large part, the 
primary purpose of rhetoric was to project an "external moral 
standard" (Adams 11). Locating reality in what he called 11ideas11 or 
11forms, 11 rather than in "appearances" (Adams 11), Plato, in contrast 
to Aristotle's emphasis on audience perception, is less certain. 
But Plato insists on a reality that is independent of our perceptions of it. 
Ethos, as defined by Aristotle, 11is the most potent of all the means 
of persuasion" (Cooper 9). Though Aristotle believed that persuasion 
(arguments) included the pisteis of ethos, pathos, and logos, he implied 
that ethos is the distinguishing element of effective discourse. As 
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Cooper states, 11the distinction is between convincing the audience by 
process of reason and convincing them by your character" (236). As 
established, persuasion is central to the aim of Aristotle's rhetoric. Good 
character is defined by the specific attributes that Aristotle assigns, 
presenting itself as virtuous, noble, and above reproach (Cooper 46). 
Essential here is Aristotle's metaphysics of ethos. Character 
remains outside, external to the argument at hand. Specifically, 
inartistic proofs are external. to the persuasion. In contemporary terms, 
inartistic writing includes the kind of voiceless prose that 
presupposes an understood writer "outside" of the piece. Artistic 
proofs, on the other hand, are of greater importance to contemporary 
writing. With artistic proofs, writers must invent their own methods of 
appeal, independent from any outside point of reference. 
With these artistic proofs, writers can create the perception of good 
character. The problem with artistic proofs is that good writing does not 
necessarily have to come from good people. Using Aristotle's lists of 
favorable attributes, malevolent writers can create an ethos of good will 
that will win over an unsuspecting audience. My contention, at this 
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point, though, is not to quarrel with the moral ramifications of either 
Aristotle or Plato, but rather to expound upon their differing meanings of 
ethos. However difficult it is to separate the moral and rhetorical aims of 
both Aristotle and Plato, at this point in my discussion I must reiterate the 
principal differences of each as they apply to ethos. 
Nan Johnson is very helpful here. She says that Aristotle's rhetoric 
is a strategy that 'lfacilitates decisions in civil matters and accepts the 
appearance of goodness as sufficient." In Plato's rhetoric, however, the 
ethos evident to the listener "must be the reality rather than the 
appearance of goodness." Plato further proposes, Johnson adds, that 
"the true aim of oratory should be the 'moral good,' not merely 
persuasion as an end in itself' (Johnson 98-99). 
These distinctions between· "appearance" and "reality, 11 and between 
"persuasion" and "goodness, 11 are pivotal in differentiating Aristotle from 
Plato. Given the polarities of Aristotle's "appearance/persuasion" and 
Plato's "reality/goodness," ethos as a measurement of character and 
personality becomes clearer in the realm of distancing writers from their 
audience. Aristotle's ethos is somewhat detached. Plato's ethos is 
somewhat engaged. 
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My intention, however, is not to subordinate Aristotle's conception 
of ethos to Plato's conception. Rather, my point is that, 
given Aristotle's notion of reality from which writers attempt to portray 
themselves, ethos is the character created between writers and readers. 
In rendering this portrayal of character, writers create their ethos in 
accordance with the appearance of virtues Oustice, courage, wisdom, 
gentleness, etc.). The character of the writer is, therefore, projected to 
the audience. Writers may or may not actually possess the virtues that 
they espouse. 
Plato's conception of ethos is steeped in his insistence that writers 
seek not to mirror conventions of character, but instead seek to create 
their own version of it. As Johnson states, 
Plato's stipulation that the [writer] 
be truly virtuous must be understood 
in terms of his general philosophy 
and ethical orientation. His belief 
that the Good represents an ideal 
is fundamental to the view that the 
[writer's] virtue be obvious in thought 
and deed (99). 
Reality as subjectively determined by writers seeking goodness in their 
discourse is antithetical to Aristotle's reality as determined by writers 
seeking persuasion in their discourse. Ethos is created in Plato and is 
invented in Aristotle; In the extreme, ethos is authentic in Plato and is 
feigned in Aristotle. 
Paradoxically, though, Plato's insistence upon the subjective 
portrayal of the writer's internal vision of reality defies the very act of 
composition. Truth (reality), as it were, is beyond the realm of 
human understanding and thus cannot be communicated. As Jasper 
Neel points out, 11Plato undeniably condemns writing11 (1). Neel further 
quotes from Plato's 11Seventh Letter": 
Any serious student of serious realities 
will shrink from making truth the helpless 
object of men's ill-will by committing it 
to writing. In a word, the conclusion to 
be drawn is this; when one sees a written 
composition ... one can be sure, if the 
writer is a serious man, that his book 
does not represent his most serious 
thoughts; they remain stored up in the 
noblest region of his personality (1). 
Are rhetoricians to take this statement literally? If so, at best, 
composition is relegated to an inferior form of thinking; at worst, it 
should not exist at all. I would argue, though, that Plato is pleading for 
the kind of authentic ethos that writing by its very nature inhibits 
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in large part. The distance between the writer's "noblest region of ... 
personality" and the discourse produced indicates what I would call an 
engaged voice rather than Aristotle's "appearance" of virtue, given the 
aim to persuade a given audience by using all means available. 
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I do not mean to imply by these rather dichotomous generalizations 
that Plato's concept of ethos is too noble or ethereal for mortal 
transcription, or that Aristotle's concept of ethos is too practical and 
results only in feigned authenticity. However, I am suggesting that the 
origins of ethos are directly linked to Aristotle and Plato and that Aristotle 
is the more "distanced" of the two. This comparison must include some 
discussion of the philosophical assumptions that underlie the differences 
between Aristotle and Plato, as well as those between Quintilian and 
Cicero which will follow later in this chapter. These assumptions, 
furthermore, must involve ethics and the aims of discourse as they 
pertain to the role of ethos. 
Curiously, one major distinction in the role of ethos between 
classical and modern rhetoric involves the definition and purpose of 
ethos as a means of rhetorical appeal. Modern rhetoricians, myself 
included, search for voice in expository prose in fairly mechanical ways: 
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we count first-person pronouns; we value the personal narrative; we 
emphasize writer-based prose (at least initially); and we ask for personal 
engagement. Though these modern emphases will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three, I find it relevant at this point in my discussion of 
ethos in classical rhetoric to discuss the schism between aspects of 
ethos that began, as I will illustrate, in classical rhetoric, but have · 
widened as is evidenced by the bulk of personal writing that may 
express personality, but little character. Students, freed with poetic 
authority to express themselves--to engage their voices-to inject pizzazz 
into their prose--frequently embarrass the most seasoned among us with 
their unabashed accounts of their first sexual experience, of their last 
bout with inebriation, of their praise of the drug culture and their personal 
involvement in it, or of their hatred of certain races, creeds, or religions. 
Such confessionals (a generous term given the connotation of guilt that 
some writers fail to see) place the modern rhetorician in the dilemma of 
rewarding or admonishing writers for expressing ethos in place of ethics 
in their prose. To advise modern writers to be themselves, to show their 
pulse in an expository essay is to invite, sometimes, honesty without 
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ethics, at least the virtues of ethics as classically defined by Aristotle, 
Plato, Quintilian, and Cicero. 
Can non-virtuous people be virtuous writers? Is there a distinction 
between ethos and ethics? Though the ethics and aims of discourse are 
not directly germane to the purpose of this paper, I find it nonetheless 
necessary to mention in my discussion of classical rhetoric--and the 
rhetorics to follow--the differences between ethos and ethics. As 
Johnson states: 
An examination of the historical signifi-
cance of ethos in rhetorical theory is a 
particularly effective· means of clarifying 
directions in modern rhetoric because de-
finitions of the role of ethos have been 
linked traditionally to definitions of the 
aims of persuasion and the obligations of 
rhetorical education (98). 
Central to this clarification is the difference between the aims of Plato's 
and Aristotle's rhetoric. The rhetorician, Plato argues, "should be a 
philosopher, not a panderer, and should aim to lead the souls of his 
[readers] to the 'knowledge of ideas.' ... [and] not merely to belief or 
pleasure" (Johnson 99). True goodness and virtue, not the appearance, 
are essential to Plato's rhetoric. Writers, in other words, have a moral 
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function that transcends strategies for appeasing audiences. With this 
purpose, truth and audience acceptance may not merge. Ethos, with the 
added dimension of ethics, is the projection of a moral voice, of 11moral 
values which will enable [the writer] to improve the character of the 
community11 (Johnson 99). 
In contrast, Aristotle has a more practical view of the aim of rhetoric. 
In Aristotle's view, 11morality is not an absolute11 (Johnson 102), but is 
rather a 11pragmatic strategy which serves practical wisdom ... the 
rhetorician need not be virtuous11 (Johnson 103). Nevertheless, Aristotle 
is careful in enumerating the objective criteria for which an audience will 
deem a writer virtuous. · The writer must appear to be just, courageous, 
magnificent, gentle, and wise. The emergence of ethos remains at the 
core of Aristotle's means of persuasion. Interestingly, Plato never 
mentions ethos, though implied throughout Gorgias and Phaedrus is 
Plato's emphasis on an ethic from a genuine writer who seeks to 
change mens' souls. 
Such moral classifications, as tempting as they are to the 
discussion of ethos, tend, however, to entangle the distinctions 
between the objective and subjective distances of voice in rhetoric. 
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would concede that Yoos' assertion of the conflation of ethos and ethics 
invites philosophic inquiry that is beyond the specific scope of this paper. 
And I would agree that the gist of Yoos' points concerning ethics casts a 
shadow over Aristotle's insistence upon a knowable world characterized 
by objective virtues that the writer can, if need be, 11morally11 project with 
11immoral11 aims. From Plato's absolutely moral position, hypocrisy best 
captures the ethical essence of Aristotle, though I think that this 
generality--even though I offer it as my own--is harsh in that Aristotle 
views rhetoric as a strategic means of discovery and not as a search for 
transcendent truth. For Yoos, however, Aristotle's ethos allows writers 11to 
distort the audience's perception of their own personal qualities" in 
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achieving their aim of persuasion. If persuasion is the aim of rhetoric, if 
the "generation of ethos manipulates trust to get contentions accepted," 
then Yoos' harsh conclusion must be considered: "ethical appeal in 
rhetoric is basically unethical and dishonest. A bizarre shift in 
nomenclature in the history of rhetoric has led us to call such appeals 
ethical" (57). Though Yoos refrains from any direct discussion of Plato, I 
infer that Yoos' contention that ethos must include ethics would embrace 
Plato's "true" aim of rhetoric. Ethos is, according to Yoos, 
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11the method whereby the philosopher and his pupil free themselves from 
all worldly encumbrances in the pursuit and eventual attainment of 
absolute truth ... so long as the virtuous rhetor keeps the audience's best 
interests at heart11 (58). 
These two voices from the past--Aristotle and Plato--provide a solid 
rhetorical foundation upon which modern composition can 
position itself. Aristotle is pragmatic and objective, viewing writing as a 
means of persuasion carried out through the use of all means available. 
Ethos (granted Yoos' contention that ethos is morally ambiguous) is the 
most powerful of the pisteis of ethos, pathos, and logos, and seeks to 
present the writer as possessing certain positive traits. 
Plato, conversely, is idealistic and subjective, viewing writing as a 
means of spiritual transcendence, even though he paradoxically 
condemns writing as a removal from an internal reality that goes beyond 
our efforts to transcribe it. The writer and audience, teacher 
and student, join in a common ~earch for truth, and in Yoos' 
implications, ethos and ethics merge, for writers must be truly virtuous 
people seeking causes greater than themselves. 
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Like Plato in many respects, Cicero, the great Roman orator, 
believed that writers should be great people and that ethos should reflect 
the genuine character of writers (I substitute the word 11writer11 for 
11speaker11 throughout this work). Unlike Aristotle, however, Cicero does 
not assign specific attributes to 11goodness. 11 Relevant to my discussion 
of ethos, however, is Cicero's "compromise" (my word) between Plato's 
idealism and Aristotle's pragmatism. This compromise, though 
ambiguous, is nonetheless stated with reasonable clarity in the following 
passage: 
Feelings are won over by a man's merit, 
achievements or reputable life, quali-
fications easier to embellish, if only 
they are real, than to fabricate where 
non-existent (Of Oratory 240). 
Sincerity is preferable to fabrication, though implicit within the above 
passage is Yoos' assertion of Aristotle's "feigned ethos" (Yoos 42). 
Moreover, Cicero is much more direct about the importance of 
ethos when he states that good style and diction can make writers 
"appear upright, well-bred and virtuous men" (Of Oratory 240). 
Cicero seems to combine the rhetorical essence of both Plato and 
38 
Aristotle in that he prefers 11goodness11 to be the true core of the writer, 
though, more practically, he stresses various techniques that render the 
appearance of goodness. Cicero seems to acknowledge, if not answer, 
the moral quagmire implied in Plato and Aristotle involving eloquence 
and character. In other words, in response to my earlier question, 
non-virtuous people can project Aristotle's attributes of character. 
Cicero, accordingly, embraces both the ideal and practical aspects of 
rhetoric. Yet, his philosophy is aligned more with Aristotle's than it is 
with Plato's. 
Conversely, Quintilian, the last great rhetorician of the classical 
period, is more of a disciple of Plato than he is of Aristotle. He 
essentially equates ethos with Plato's idea of transcendental goodness: 
Since an orator [writer] is a good man, 
and a good man cannot be conceived to 
exist without virtuous inclinations, 
and virtue ... the orator [writer] must 
above all things study morality, and 
must obtain a thorough knowledge of all 
that is just and honorable, without which 
no one can either be a good man or an 
able speaker [writer] (353). 
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Although Quintilian, like Cicero and Aristotle, specifies throughout his 
work the practical necessities of speaking. well, his focus, like Plato's, 
remains centered on moral goodness--not the appearance of goodness, 
but the reality of goodness. For Quintilian, only good people can be 
good writers, and good writers should be "at once of eloquence and of 
morality" (353). Of interest here is that throughout the works of Quintilian 
I encounter his own ethos. Unlike the other classical writers I have read, 
Quintilian projects a sincerity that parallels his ideas on rhetoric and the 
writer. Lacking the loftiness of Plato, the cynicism of Aristotle, and the 
ambiguity of Cicero, Quintilian reads most like an authentic writer 
speaking to a person. 
In conclusion, in my discussion of ethos in rhetoric, I have found it 
necessary to trace its.tenets to the major classical works of Aristotle, 
Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian. Though this attempt has been brief--
skimming the surface as it were--it shows clearly, I believe, that 
contemporary rhetoric has deep roots in these major voices from the 
past. 
I will now shift to a discussion of contemporary ethos, emphasizing, 
as I proceed, that current discussions of ethos have correlations in 
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classical rhetoric. I will also show in the following chapter that much of 
the rhetorical philosophic differences among contemporary rhetoricians, I 
believe, can be better understood if we understand the evolution of ethos 
as it is distinguished by character and personality. 
Chapter Ill 
Modern Rhetoric: Assertion of Self 
There is what I would call a certain rubber-
gloved quality to the voice and register typical 
of most academic discourses--not just author-
evacuated but also showing a kind of reluctance 
to touch one's meanings with one's naked fingers 
Peter Elbow 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian 
made notable contributions to the importance of ethos in discourse. _ All 
believed, in varying degrees, that ethos was inseparable from discourse, 
that the character projected in communication was the strongest element 
of persuasion, and that ethics comprised an essential dimension to the 
effectiveness of discourse. I contend that Plato and Quintilian advocate 
ethos that virtually equates writer with discourse. Furthermore, Aristotle 
and Cicero advocate ethos that partially removes the writer from 
discourse (that is, writers are more at liberty to create an ethos separate 
from their own ethos). In sum, these classic voices combine to promote 
the importance of ethos in discourse. These voices, however, were 
silenced in the last century. 
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For chronological convenience, I will date the death of ethos in 
1875 when Harvard reinstituted rhetoric as a subject proper. Influenced 
largely by the works of Blair, Campbell, and Whately, Harvard began 
what is today termed current-traditional rhetoric. This rhetoric, as 
previously discussed, emphasizes discourse as defined by classification 
of modes, by analysis of words, sentences, and paragraphs, and by 
punctuational and grammatical correctness. Given Kinneavy's four-
element triangle--writer, audience, reality, and text--as a point of 
reference, subject matter dominates current-traditional rhetoric with its 
emphasis on, as Berlin states in "Current-Traditional Rhetoric ... 11 , an 
"external world existing independent of the mind 11 (1). With the 
philosophic assumption that writers could "capture" Aristotle's conception 
of a static and external reality, the writer's primary aim of rhetoric was to 
duplicate a rational universe. Though style became important, invention 
diminished, since the world, as it were, already existed external and 
separate from any individual's interpretation of it. 
Rhetoric, viewed as a conduit between a perceiver and an external, 
objective reality, was thus stripped of invention. Equally important, and 
pivotal to the purpose of this paper, was the irrelevance of ethos. Writers 
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were not to invent their interpretations of the world, but were rather 
silenced by the "scientific exactitude" (Berlin 1) of the world molding 
them. A writer's character, ethics, voice, or ideology were encumbrances 
to the cold-eyed view of objectivity. 
The question becomes, then, what happened to ethos under the 
guise of a current-traditional rhetoric that purports to embrace classical 
principles, especially those of invention, arrangement, and style that 
come directly from Aristotle? 
Robert J. Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea Lunsford in their 11The 
Revival of Rhetoric in America" provide an interesting insight into the 
history and evolution of classical rhetoric, especially as it directly affects 
the role of ethos in written discourse. Essentially, rhetoric 
declined in the nineteenth century. As noted earlier, the influences of 
Blair, Campbell, and Whately altered the direction of writing 
instruction from its classical emphasis on invention, arrangement, 
and style, to an emphasis on style alone, though with some attention to 
arrangement. Students were to bring to writing classes their presumedly 
preconceived ideas and were then instructed in the proper arrangement 
and style of presenting them. 
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Invention was truncated. This truncation is directly attributed to the 
teachings of Peter Ramus, who "ordained that rhetoric should offer 
training in style and delivery," and that "subject matter [was to be] 
derived from considerations of etymology" (Lanham 89). Lanham goes 
on to say that "rhetoric thus becomes, for Ramus, largely a matter of 
verbal ornament of style" (89). 
As Connors, Ede, and Lunsford point out, 11he major function [of 
rhetoric] in the classical period was as a synthetic art which brought 
together knowledge in various fields with audiences of various kinds; its 
goal was the discovery· and sharing of knowledge" (3). But 
nineteenth-century cultural trends shifted the rhetorical emphasis away 
from discovery. Knowledge became specialized within the domain of 
economic interests that flourished in the Industrial Revolution of this 
period. Additionally, student enrollment "doubled in the last quarter of 
the century, [and] teachers had to contend not with a small group of 
students ... but with large and increasingly unwieldy classes" (Connors, 
Ede, Lunsford 3). For purposes of practical expedience, teachers had to 
develop measurable standards for essay evaluation, standards that 
understandably stressed correctness in terms of grammar, mechanics, 
and punctuation. 
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Finally, and ironically, another factor that contributed to the birth of 
current-traditional rhetoric (or the decline of classical rhetoric) was the 
establishment of English departments that saw not rhetoric as their 
primary mission, but rather literature. Francis James Child, Harvard's 
chairman of the English department, "built a powerful academic 
department, one based almost exclusively on literary scholarship. It was 
this Harvard model which predominated in American higher 
education ... in spite of attempts to hold to a more classical rhetorical 
model" (Connors, Ede, Lunsford 4). 
Current-traditional rhetoric, under Blair, Campbell, and Whately's 
emphasis on style, and under the nineteenth-century trends toward 
industry, increased student enrollment, and Harvard's preference for 
literature as the discipline of choice became the dominant rhetoric that 
still largely prevails today. Students write in response to literature, and it 
would seem that the literary essay forced rhetoric to endorse a simplified 
argumentative writing. Ethos, despite efforts to resuscitate it, is lost as in 
this example taken from a 1978 article entitled "Technology As A Form of 
Consciousness: A Study Of Contemporary Ethos11 : 
Technology can be provisionally defined 
as the manipulation of the contingent 
and local to achieve material results, 
to distinguish it from science as the 
study of the universal to achieve 
verifiable understanding [ of] the 
rhetorical character of science which 
is dependent upon the abstracting and 
symbolizing inherent in human knowledge 
and upon the communication necessary to 
achieve verification (Miller 228). 
I am somewhat amazed. Is this passage a preposterous illustration of 
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prose gone awry? Not really. I took this wording from an article written 
by an English instructor who included the words 11consciousness11 and 
11ethos11 in the title. Upon further inspection I found the pronoun 11111 only 
three times in a text that invokes Aristotle, ethos, character, and 
communication. · I also found that her average sentence length, as taken 
from a sampling of three paragraphs, was thirty-three words, and that 
one of her longer sentences exceeded sixty words. Perhaps most 
startling is her thesis: 
Ethos, as a disposition which, when held 
in common, comes to seem 'right' or 
'ethical' or persuasive, is an index 
of culture. Our technological culture 
should be expected to give rise to an 
ethos of technology (Miller 228). 
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This writer is distanced. Granted, my claim here may be anecdotal and I 
realize that one case does not make a valid point. But I nonetheless find 
it significant that an English teacher wrote this in her discussion of ethos. 
Surely a perusal of 11non-English11 contemporary discourse would support 
my point that not much ethos exists in current-traditional rhetoric. This 
kind of sterile, distanced ethos seems to saturate current-traditional 
prose. I maintain, however, that contemporary rhetoric is at a significant 
crossroads. On the one side are the advocates who embrace what they 
consider the "traditional" approach to writing, a tradition steeped in 
classical rhetoric. On the other side are the advocates of various 11new 
rhetorics" who proclaim that the ancient paradigms of rhetoric no longer 
suit the needs of modern composition. This dichotomy, though, is 
imbricated by basic misunderstandings concerning classical and 
contemporary rhetoric. Current camps need not contend for their stake 
in the new territory called modern rhetoric; however, I think we need to 
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clarify the distinctions between the current-traditionalists and the new 
rhetoricians and find the common ground that unites far more than it 
divides. I assert that ethos is at the crux of the crossroads, and once we 
can "relocate" its role, we will have that common ground that we have 
sought since the Composition Revolution of 1963---primary of which is 
the reemergence of ethos. 
Historically, as I established in Chapter Two, ethos was the 
essential, defining element of classical rhetoric. Though Aristotle 
and Plato held different positions on the ethics of ethos, and though 
Cicero and Quintilian further expounded upon the role of ethics 
given the extremes of Aristotle and Plato, ethos remained at the 
core of their discussions. Tradition thus established the significance of 
ethos. Tradition, however, aided by the observations of Ramus and by 
the general movement of nineteenth-century trends, partially betrayed the 
importance of ethos by eliminating invention from the classical triad of 
invention, arrangement, and style. This triad was originally Aristotle's 
pentad of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Without 
invention, writers are denied their own importance in discovering ideas. 
Current-traditionalists, as oxymoronic as the term implies, are clinging to 
a distorted, or at least misunderstood, idea of what is traditional in 
rhetoric. Arrangement and style have survived the passage of time, 
prospering, in fact, across the gamut of classical, modern, and 
poststructural rhetoric. These features are reasonably teachable, 
learnable, and will remain, I would think, uncontroversial as entities of 
composition. And I say this without disparagement. 
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We have made great gains in the teaching of grammar, of 
organization, of style, and of invention as it applies to heuristics in terms 
of problem-solving strategies that have influenced composition theories 
these past few decades. But ethos remains nebulous, blurred in the 
distinctions between character and personality. Though Connors, Ede, 
and Lunsford in their "The Revival of Rhetoric in America" attribute the 
general loss of ethos to industry, increased student enrollment, and the 
discipline's emphasis on literature (47), I would concur that only their first 
point--industry--has any real philosophic, attenuating validity (more 
students and literary emphasis are logistical, not philosophic, concerns). 
The Industrial Revolution, and the assembly-line products it produced, 
mirrored the manner in which we viewed the world. As Berlin notes in 
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11Current-Traditional Rhetoric: Paradigm and Practice, 11 reality for current-
traditionalists is 11rational 1 regular, and certain .... Meaning thus exists 
independent of the perceiving mind, reposing in external reality11 (2). 
Thus with the explosion of science and technology--the extensions of 
industry--we tend to view the world with objectivity I with an externality 
that distances us as writers in our attempts to communicate with an 
audience that should see the same world we do. Understandably, with 
this paradigm, arrangement and style prevail. The world is already 
invented. This pre-existent world denies, though, the writer's role in 
it, excepting his ability to transcribe it in an orderly and correct manner 
appropriate for a standardized audience. 
Before I badger much further the loss of ethos in current-traditional 
rhetoric, I need to concede an important point: not all discourse needs 
the presence of a living, breathing writer. Great discoveries--cures for 
cancer, solutions to the world's wars, ideas about hunger and poverty--
can be communicated void of character, personality, voice, tone, or 
ethos. Hovering above, far outside the text, the ethics of such subject 
matter would certainly imply an intelligent, compassionate, and 
concerned individual, but whether or not this person announces himself 
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with anecdotes, first-person pronouns, or a stance that promotes 
credibility beyond his power to reason is irrelevant. We can profit from 
this voiceless prose. But this voiceless prose exemplifies Aristotle's 
ideas of inartistic proofs, a kind of writing that comes from 11an outside 
authority. 11 My focus in this paper, however, centers on the role of ethos 
in expository writing as it applies primarily to developing writers, writers 
who must rely on artistic proofs, a challenge of the first order. And 
though I may hedge a bit on my concession, I question whether or not 
the greater scientific discoveries would have happened if those thinkers 
had not first sharpened their minds by rendering experience--experience 
steeped in personal observation--rather than merely explaining 11objective 
reality11 with their ethos removed from Kinneavy's communications 
triangle. 
This relinquishing of self under the guise of objectivity is central to 
the rise of current-traditional rhetoric. As I have indicated, English 
composition, as it was first conceived at Harvard in 1875, was viewed 
primarily as a service course to the business and scientific disciplines 
that dominate academia. Matters of ideas, style, expression, and 
ideology were left largely to the literature courses. Composition had 
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virtually no proper subject matter. Students brought "outside" knowledge 
to the writing classroom where their objective was to present existing 
information with proper organization and correct grammar. Invention 
was ignored; consequently, ethos was neglected since scientific 
knowledge and business knowledge were deemed ideologically neutral. 
The point of writing was not to question or discover or to "know thyself 111 
as Emerson implored, but was rather to record with as much precision 
as possible logical and rational explanations of an unchanging universe. 
Rhetoric fell on bad times. Without a curriculum of its own, the role of 
ethos remained somewhat vague through the better part of the last 
century. As Virginia Burke remarks, '1here is chaos today [1965] 
because since the turn of the century composition has lacked an 
informing discipline, without which no field can maintain its proper 
dimensions ... or its very integrity" (3). Even more pointedly, Richard 
Young, in discussing the decaying influence of current-traditional 
rhetoric, cites the following statement Wayne Booth made at an ML.A 
convention in 1964: 
Of all the causes of our rhetorical 
shoddiness, the only one that you and 
I have much chance of doing anything 
about is our shoddy rhetorical theory 
and our shoddier teaching thereof (326). 
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The revolution in rhetoric had begun. More apt, the revival of rhetoric as 
rooted in Aristotle, Plato, Quintilian, and Cicero was well underway in the 
plethora of the New Rhetorics. Ethos, with all of its classical implications, 
took on a more significant role in the communications triangle: the self 
emerged. 
This rediscovery of ethos, however, does not diminish the 
significance of academic discourse. Nor does ethos surrender itself 
entirely to the 1960's neo-Platonist school of expressionistic rhetoric that 
all too often relegated writing to the superfluous act of describing the 
sound of one hand clapping, or of splashing readers with one's feelings 
about life with a license to disregard form and grammar. This revival of 
ethos in rhetoric--though admittedly exploited in various ways--reasserted 
the self as constituting one of the three Aristotelian means of persuasion. 
Though I may leap to a simplistic conclusion, ethos after 1963 began to 
resume a more significant role. 
Peter Elbow, one of the leading advocates of the reassertion of 
ethos in rhetoric, enumerates several significant points about the uses 
and abuses of ethos in academic discourse in his article "Reflections on 
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Academic Discourse". Defining academic discourse as the "discourse 
that academics use when they publish for other academics, 11 Elbow 
proceeds to defend "the language of the academy" (135). We need, 
Elbow implies, to teach the kind of standardized writing that the business 
world expects from college writers--prose characterized by its current-
traditional emphases on correctness, organization, and subject matter. 
This brand of writing is voiceless in that its purpose is to convey 
academic or bureaucratic information. Even though we may view this 
kind of discourse as ineffective writing, students need, as Elbow states, 
to know it for the 0papers and reports and exams they'll have to write in 
their various courses throughout their college career ... if we don't prepare 
them for these tasks we'll be shortchanging them" (135). 
The transition between current-traditional and New Rhetoric thus 
presents a dilemma of sorts: we must teach students "to play the game" 
of a business world that all too often rewards what we call ineffective, 
voiceless writing while at the same time we must teach that writing has a 
subject matter of its own that emphasizes ethos as a defining 
characteristic of effective writing. Students, to their dismay, get a mixed 
message about what writing involves. Still largely uninformed about the 
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theories and techniques of Kinneavy, Booth, Christensen, Elbow, and a 
host of others who have shaped a new rhetoric, many teachers stress 
prose without ethos. My own department syllabus shows the degree to 
which we still cling to current-traditional, "academic discourse." This 
passage comes from our introduction to Composition II: 
English Composition II is designed to prepare 
students for written communication needs in their 
other college courses, as well as in their business 
and professional communications .... The practical, the 
accurate, and the acceptable means of communicating· 
as an educated person will be stressed. 
To reinforce these goals we add a complete page of standards of correct 
usage with point deduction penalties for violations. Additionally, we 
prohibit contractions and insist upon 11the third-person approach (one, 
he, it, they)." Furthermore, we emphasize the rhetorical modes of 
development: classification, process, definition, comparison, 
cause/effect, and argumentation. 
No ethos here, excepting, of course, what the writer specifies, or 
what the teacher dictates; 
But Elbow maintains, and I agree, that this kind of academic 
discourse has its place. Much good can be said of current-traditional 
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rhetoric. Correctness counts. Elbow contends, however, that students 
need "non-academic discourse" as well. This kind of discourse makes 
certain assumptions about the role, or the place, in which writers place 
themselves. Elbow's first point is that students should write because 
they want to, not because they are forced to. Stating that ''very few of 
our students will ever have to write academic discourse after college, 11 
Elbow views good writing instruction as determined by 'whether it makes 
students more likely to use writing in their lives" (136). Specifically I this 
kind of writing goes beyond the academic discourse required in 
business, industry I and science--beyond the type of distanced discourse 
that distinguishes some contemporary writing. Elbow talks about the 
kind of writing that includes letters, journals, stories, poems, and writing 
in the public realm for "informal circulation or even serious publication" 
(136). The assertion of self, the projection of ethos, becomes the driving 
force of inspired, personal writing. 
Few of us would argue that most of our students like writing, that 
they come to class eager to learn, to explore, and to express themselves. 
They come, as a generality, because it is a requirement. But to excuse 
these students as the products of the paradigmatic shift that largely 
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shaped current-traditional rhetoric with its emphasis on a rational 
universe is to abrogate the role of the writer in composition. As I 
established earlier, Francis James Child, Harvard's chairman of the 
English department, built, in 18751 a "powerful academic department, one 
based almost exclusively on literary scholarship" (Connor, Ede, 
Lundsford 4). Literary scholarship tends to diminish composition 
scholarship. 
We tend, as a profession, to know our literature and understandably 
to teach it. Composition tends to be perceived as the "grunt'' work of 
graduate assistants. Rhetoricians, as a result, are nearly impossible to 
find. As a personal case in point, I had the recent experience of 
interviewing applicants for a composition position that my English 
department advertised. I talked with people who had impeccable 
credentials: advanced degrees, years of experience, numerous 
publications, and active participation in state and national English 
organizations. But to an applicant, all had degrees and experience and 
interest in literature. What composition they had taught had been done 
years ago in graduate school. Rhetorical theories, names, and strategies 
were foreign to them. One applicant in particular sticks out: she had a 
58 
Ph.D. from a private university and three pages of publications. When I 
asked her about rhetoric, she replied that although she had never 
really considered it, she thought that it sounded like a good idea. When 
I asked her about how she would teach composition, she said, with 
hesitation and confusion, that she supposed her students would respond 
to the literature she assigned. Reluctant to push my point, but curious to 
know, I asked her in what manner her students responded to literature. 
She said they "critically analyze" the pieces using the "proper 
terminology" and with the "correct form and usage appropriate to a 
literary response." This literary-based rhetoric, as I would call it, was not 
intended to generate ideas, to function as a mode of invention for self-
exploration, but was rather a substitution of literature for composition. 
Literary analyses are valid and essential--for literature courses--but they 
do little for composition courses unless they are used as a means for 
teaching writing. 
My personal digression here supports, I think, Elbow's contention 
that writers are denied their motivation, their voices, when bombarded 
with academic discourse. Additionally, this anecdote shows that 
academic discourse is not something "out there" in business 
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or science, but is on the upper floors of our own departments. If we are 
not careful, we will find ourselves speaking our own jargon. 
Elbow, maintaining that we need to motivate students by allowing 
their personal expressions (academic discourse largely inhibits this), 
argues further that we as composition teachers must take a "larger view 
of human discourse" (136). This larger view, as noted earlier, must take 
into account the difference between explaining and rendering. Perusals 
of textbooks establish Elbow's point: composition is generally defined as 
"expository prose" with subsequent attention on matters of description, 
narration, and argumentation. The point, tacit or not, is that writers are 
to explain, to expose, a rational and external world through rhetorical 
modes that stress subject matter and, to a lesser degree, audience. 
Little, if any, mention is made of ethos, of the writer's own sense of self 
in the rendering of his or her version of a particular subject. 
Most important in Elbow's discussion of the drawbacks of academic 
discourse is his third point that the use of such writing "often masks a 
lack of genuine understanding" (136). Ironically, 11we need nonacademic 
discourse for the purpose of helping students produce good academic 
discourse" (Elbow 136). Ethos, in this context, serves as a heuristic, as a 
60 
method of invention that allows students to explore first what they know 
(or seem to know) best: themselves. Claiming that "many students can 
repeat and explain a principle in physics or economics ... but cannot 
simply tell a story of what is going on in the room or country around 
them on account of that principle," Elbow makes a valid point, creating, 
in effect, an analogy between rote learning and cognitive insights--or, in 
the jargon of educational psychology, between declarative and 
procedural knowledge (136). As Elbow further states, "students distance 
themselves from experiencing or really internalizing the concepts they 
are allegedly learning" (136). 
Without dipping further than I need to--or am able to--into 
educational psychology, I nonetheless surmise that writing in the past 
century largely reflects our epistemological insistence upon viewing the 
world as a static, rational, and observable entity separate from the 
person seeing it. Writers, therefore, are not involved in the making of 
knowledge, but are rather conduits between the externalities of existence 
and an audience who either accepts or rejects discourse on the criterion 
of good or poor representation of "common reality." If this premise has 
any validity, then I would further argue that invention is truncated from 
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the triad of Aristotle's rhetoric since "reality" is already invented. Without 
invention, I would further argue that ethos becomes mute. 
Ethos, then, in contemporary rhetoric, is seeking to reassert itself in 
writing. Current-traditionalists, citing Aristotle and Cicero as their 
pedagogical antecedents, claim correctly that their revival of arrangement 
and style is imperative in their teaching of composition. I would contend, 
however, that they largely neglect the ethos that both these classical 
orators espoused as essential to effective communication. Their world 
was not as objective as some current-traditionalists would have it. 
Conversely, various proponents of the New Rhetoric, claiming Plato 
and Quintilian as their pedagogical antecedents, oversimplify these 
classical orators' ideas concerning the subjectivity of a "reality" that is 
determined exclusively by the individual perceiver. Contemporary ethos 
thus equivocates between Aristotle and Plato. Perversions of either 
viewpoint can yield ineffective results: discourse becomes poetic 
expression that narrowly considers subject and audience or it becomes 
pedantic prose that solely considers subject. 
Thus far I have surveyed the general status of ethos in 
contemporary rhetoric and have indicated that ethos defines itself 
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differently in accordance with a particular rhetorical orientation. 
We are currently positioning ourselves somewhere between the 
paradigms of current-traditional rhetoric and the New Rhetorics. I have, 
furthermore, indicated that though current-traditional practice is the 
dominant mode of teaching, its deemphasis of ethos as a persuasive 
technique in discourse is not in keeping with the classical heritage of 
rhetoric as established by Aristotle, Plato, Quintilian, and Cicero. They all 
asserted, in varying degrees, that ethos is the foundation of effective 
communication. This diminishment of ethos in current-traditional rhetoric 
has produced, in part, the kind of sterile, academic prose that Elbow 
addresses: prose designed to accommodate the rising science and 
business concerns of post-1875 American society; prose designed to 
facilitate the growing number of students that crowd our classrooms, 
making standardized evaluations necessary; and prose designed to 
appease literature teachers seeking analysis as a means of composition. 
On the other hand, the various new rhetorics that have emerged 
since 1963 have attempted to establish composition as an independent 
discipline with its own unique curriculum that approaches writing as a 
teachable and learnable craft. As Stephen North says in his definitive 
text The Making of Knowledge in Composition, prior to 1963 and well 
into the decade that followed, we had no graduate programs in 
composition, a course that was often described as the "ghetto" or the 
"stepchild" of English departments. Composition was "something that 
had to be taught--or, perhaps endured. But it was not perceived as a 
discipline or a field, as a subject matter suitable for graduate study" (i). 
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We now stand poised to combine the best strategies from classical 
rhetoric and its current-traditional adaptations, and the eclectic strands of 
new rhetorics (with roots also in classical rhetoric) that have in common 
the reemergence of ethos as a primary force in effective writing. 
Pivotal, though, to this reemergence of ethos is the nagging 
question of when ethos becomes excessive. In the perfect rhetorical 
worlds of theorists ranging from Aristotle to Kinneavy to Booth, ethos 
plays a significant role in the communications triangle, comprising one-
third of the persuasive means available to the writer. But as Booth points 
out, 0perversions of the rhetorician's balance" occur when the writer 
distorts his discourse by 11unbalancing11 through over-emphasis on pathos 
(the "advertiser's stance'?, on logos (the "pedant's stance"), and on ethos 
(the "entertainer's stance'?. Booth goes on to explain this third 
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imbalance as the 11willingness to sacrifice substance to personality and 
charm 11 where 11the speaker's voice can lead to empty colorfulness 11 (144). 
And as Pixton points out in his discussion of Booth's rhetorical stance, 
11the rhetorical stance is not the stance of the entertainer, who uses 
personal information excessively to call attention to himself or herself, 
rather than using the information moderately to enliven the meaning" 
(265). 
My point is that the reemergence of ethos plays a significant 
though not a central or dominating role in the new rhetorics. This 
qualification, I think, is necessary to my discussion of ethos in the light of 
the important contributions of Flower, Shaughnessy, and even Barthes 
(who will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four), among others, who 
advocate in varying degrees the centrality of ethos in· what Flower calls 
'Writer-Based Prose." Though developmental in its pedagogy, this 
prose is a "verbal expression written by a writer to himself and for 
himself' (19). Flower- implies that writers, as they mature, will become 
less "egocentric" in their efforts to communicate to an audience. But her 
pedagogical intention is clear: 
Writer-based prose is a workable concept 
which can help us teach writing. As a way 
to intervene in the thinking process, it taps 
intuitive communication strategies writers 
already have .... lt helps writers attack this 
demanding cognitive task [with] confidence 
that comes from an increased and self-
conscious control of the process (20). 
Within this psychological, pedagogical context, ethos is central (not 
merely significant as Booth and others suggest) in expository prose. 
This ethos-as-a-mode-of-personal-expression is perhaps most 
pronounced in Mina Shaughnessy's 1977 Errors and Expectations. 
65 
Noting that beginning writers need to "assert their individualities in a 
variety of ways" (280), Shaughnessy argues effectively that for novice 
writers, "academic writing is a trap, not a way of saying something to 
someone" (7). She implies throughout her book that writers need to 
draw from their own experience before seeking to appeal to a wider, 
more "academic" audience, writing teachers included. Peter Elbow 
extends this ethos-as-pedagogy line of thinking by referring to Flower's 
writer-based prose as "weak writing at first ... that can help us in the end 
to better writing than we would have written if we'd kept readers in mind 
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from the start" (51 ). In Writing With Power, Elbow says that 'writer-based 
prose is sometimes better than reader-based prose" (51). 
Perhaps. But my discussion of ethos as the reassertion of self must 
avoid the perversions of Booth's "entertainer's stance" and the 
pedagogical emphases of Flower's, Shaughnessy's, and Elbow's 
personal stance, for, in my analysis, though the entertainer's stance may 
be amusing and the personal stance may be instructive, neither serves 
the balance that I strive to establish. At the extremes in contemporary 
rhetoric, we have the dry, sterile "pretzel prose" of Elbow's discussion of 
academic discourse--writing that I would classify as projecting 11canned 11 
character; at the other end we have the kind of writer-based prose that 
promotes the self to the exclusion of subject and audience--writing that I 
would classify as 11projected11 personality. 
As I explained in Chapter Two, the classical rhetoricians--most 
notably Aristotle and Cicero--advocated an ethos that positioned ethical 
appeal within the larger framework of logos and pathos (or subject and 
audience). And, as I have drawn that strand of thinking through 
post-1875 rhetoric, a period I identified through the research as the 
beginning of current-traditional rhetoric which diminished the importance 
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of ethos, I find in post-1963 rhetoric the reassertion of ethos that 
balances itself between the extremes of character and personality. 
Specifically, I have alluded to the major contributions of Booth, Corbett, 
and Elbow. Each, along with other modern theorists, has helped shape 
the role of ethos in contemporary rhetoric; and each, with the possible 
exception of Elbow, has striven for the balance between character and 
personality. 
The revival of ethos in rhetoric, as I have indicated throughout this 
paper, is closely linked with the 11rhetorical revolution 11 of 1963. 
Rhetoricians were then, in Richard Young's phrase, 11working on the 
margin, 11 seeking to define a discipline that had long been neglected, a 
discipline that belonged 11if anywhere, in speech departments." Young 
further maintains 11that composition was not a proper academic discipline 
at all but merely a service that English departments performed, often with 
reluctance11 (325). 
More pointedly, Virginia Burke asserted in 1965 that ''there is chaos 
today because since the turn of the century composition has lacked an 
informing discipline, without which no field can maintain its proper 
dimensions ... or its very integrity11 {Burke 5). With this renewal of interest 
in all facets of rhetoric--facets rooted in Aristotle's triad of invention, 
arrangement, and style--ethos, an integral aspect of classical rhetoric, 
resurfaced after a century of silence. 
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The problem, though, with the renewal of ethos in rhetoric, with the 
reassertion of self in writing, lies in its ethereal nature. Beyond the 
classical definitions that I reviewed in Chapter Two, and beyond the 
mechanical methods that numerous writers have discussed, methods 
that effectively include first-person pronouns, personal narratives, 
anecdotes, and the thoughtfulness of good grammar and organization, 
what else does ethos involve? Is ethos in the text or not? Contemporary 
theory is divided on this issue, and in Chapter Four I will clarify the two 
camps of thought--the 11neo-traditionalists11 (my term) of post-1963 
discussed in this chapter, and the poststructuralists, whose thinking has 
rattled conventional ideas of locating ethos in writing, ethos, they claim, 
that announces the death of the author. 
For now, however, and for the balance of this chapter, I will 
synthesize the ethos that I think characterizes contemporary rhetoric. In 
seeking some sort of consensus, I have analyzed Jim Corder's and 
James Berlin's writings on the topic and have concluded that each 
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promotes the revival of ethos in composition, and that each advocates a 
middle-ground presence between writer and reader. Of interest, also, is 
their own ethos in their discussions of ethos. Although their themes are 
similar, their voices are not. Corder, by my classification, projects 
personality; Berlin, by my classification, projects character. Although I 
find it difficult to separate content from ethos (which alone substantiates 
the ethereal qualities of ethos), I will nonetheless plunge on, using as my 
broad criteria both classical and neo-traditionalist attributes of ethos that 
I have discussed in this paper thus far. Specifically, I will first be as 
objective as possible in looking at the language, the personal anecdotes, 
first-person references, and other grammatical/stylistic nuances that each 
writer uses. Second, and with admitted subjectivity, I will attempt to 
determine their classical sense of ethical appeal. Who 11best11 portrays 
himself, as Aristotle advised, as 11just1 courageous, temperate, 
magnanimous, sagacious, magnificent, gentle, and wise11? (Cooper 47). 
Who, dare I say, is Cicero's 11good 11 man? 
For purposes of this analysis, I have chosen Jim W.Corder's 
· 
11Hunting for Ethos Where They Say It Can't Be Found11 and 11Argument As 
Emergence, Rhetoric as Love, 11 aad James Berlin's 11Rhetoric and 
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Ideology in the Writing Class" and "Current-Traditional Rhetoric: 
Paradigm and Practice." Again, I have chosen these articles because 
both writers are contemporary rhetoricians, both discuss ethos, and both 
promote in the content of their discourse a distinct ethos. The 
differences lie in their own voices--in how they say what they say--more 
than in what they say. 
The most obvious and immediate contrast is found in their titles: 
Corder projects a personal, humorous, and even provocative touch by 
titling his one piece "Hunting for Ethos Where They Say It 
Can't Be Found." The contraction itself denotes informality. 11Hunting11 
also suggests a certain bemusement about what he sees as the 
poststructuralists' insistence on the idea that the "author is dead." 
Additionally, the pronoun "they" sets up a tongue-in-cheek quarrel 
between himself and the poststructural thinking he addresses in his 
essay. Corder's other title, "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love," 
evinces an even more personal touch, invoking the language of the 
1960's. 
In stark contrast, Berlin's two articles are titled in a straight-forward, 
matter-of-fact manner: "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class, 11 
though accurately reflecting the thesis of his article, gives no hint of 
humor, irony, or the type of mock argument that Corder reveals in his 
titles. Similarly, "Current-Traditional Rhetoric: Paradigm and Practice" 
renders no personal flavor about Berlin's attitude toward his subject. 
Corder's titles are personal and inviting. Berlin's are not. 
Equally significant, their respective introductions differentiate their 
personal involvements. Corder's "Hunting for Ethos" begins with an 
anecdote about "an ancient tool [that] holds down a stack of 
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papers ... in the corner of my office." In the introduction of his "Argument 
as Emergence" Corder includes such phrases as "we're always standing 
some place in our lives, 11 and "we tell our lives and live our tales, enjoying 
where we can, tolerating what we must." 
Berlin, consistent with the distance suggested by his titles, begins 
his "Rhetoric and Ideology" with this sentence: "The question of ideology 
has never been far from discussions of writing instruction in the modern 
American college." His tone and language suggest formality: "It is true 
that some rhetorics have denied their imbrication in ideology .. .in various 
manifestations .. .in addressing competing discursive claims." This same 
crisp, distanced tone is evident in his "Current-Traditional Rhetoric": "For 
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nearly a century, teachers of composition have been dominated by a 
paradigm, a set of tacit assumptions which has determined how they 
define and carry out their activities in research and teaching." Corder 
says, "I've been quarreling with myself .. .foolishly, often trying to serve my 
own interests." In his search for ethos, Corder "wanted to imagine that I 
was writing another gloss on Aristotle, trying to learn what he meant in 
what he said about ethos." In Berlin's search for ethos, he 
states that ''two of the three bases of persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric, 
the ethical and emotional appeals, are foreclosed altogether by the 
rational, mechanistic epistemology." 
In addition to personal anecdotes, formality of language, and the 
tones of each writer that all combine to establish differing ethos, an 
approximate count of personal pronouns further establishes the 
distinction between the personality of Corder and the character of Berlin. 
In looking at the first five-hundred words of each of their articles, I 
counted the following first-person pronouns (I, me, my, we, myself): 
Corder: 33; Berlin: 3. 
This disparity is telling: Corder talks about himself; Berlin does not. 
Two related questions arise, what does the reader know of the writer? 
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Does this knowledge--the expression of ethos--reinforce the writer's 
discourse? Booth, as discussed earlier, addresses 11corruptions11 of the 
rhetorical stance, and, most relevant to ethos, what he terms the 
11entertainer's stance--the willingness to sacrifice substance to personality 
and charm, 11 which can lead to 11empty colorfulness11 (146). Does Corder 
cross this line? Here is a sampling of what the reader knows of Corder 
from reading his "Hunting for Ethos11 and 11Argument as Emergence11 : he 
has three children; he is 11not known as a writer''; he drinks wine; he can 
be a 11damn fool 11 ; he asks his students 11dumb questions11 ; he was born in 
West Texas; he did graduate work at the University of Oklahoma; he was 
11poorly taught'' in rhetoric; he 11misspent ten years as department 
chairman11 ; and he 11wrote citations [that] were printed prettily and were 
read aloud at a party for faculty members, 11 an act about which he says, 
11the hell with it. 11 
In contrast, a sampling of Berlin's "Rhetoric and Ideology" and 
"Current-Traditional Rhetoric" reveals virtually nothing about the writer's 
personality. Relevant here, though, is the classicist view of ethos as an 
ethical projection of character (as distinguished from personality--a 
modern, perhaps distorted notion of ethos). Clearly, Corder's writing 
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bristles with personality; Berlin's does not. And, by general classical 
definitions, Corder projects certain Aristotelian virtues--justice, (he sounds 
fair), wisdom (he sounds smart), and gentleness (he sounds 
modest)--but arguably not others--courage (he did work he didn't want 
to), magnificence (he's too modest), and temperateness (he drinks too 
much). Of course, Corder creates such an ethos. But nonetheless if 
Corder is put to the classical test of ethos, he subjects himself to such 
judgments. Similarly, if he is put to Booth's test of the rhetorical balance, 
he may come dangerously close to the "entertainer's stance." My point, 
though, is that Corder's ethos is personable, and whether or not 
this involvement is a positive or negative factor depends largely 
upon the audience--a point I will discuss in detail in Chapter Four. 
Berlin, conversely, reveals little of himself. His prose, in Booth's scheme, 
comes dangerously close to the 0pedant's stance." His character 
supports the classical virtues in that the reader senses Berlin's courage, 
gentleness, and sense of justice. The reader can, of course, infer from 
the content that Berlin is wise and sagacious. As with Corder's 
personable ethos, the judgment of Berlin's more distanced ethos 
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ultimately lies with the reader, at least in the poststructural theories that I 
will discuss in the next chapter. 
At some risk, however, I feel obliged to answer the question I asked 
at the outset of this brief analysis: who "best" portrctys himself as the 
"better" person? Given the parameters of classical and contemporary 
definitions of ethos, I think that both writers miss the mark: Corder falls 
slightly short of Aristotle's ideal virtues, though Cicero would applaud his 
sincerity. Plato and Quintilian would admire his personable ethos though 
they would frown upon his pedestrian ideals. Berlin's ethos is removed 
in the classical rhetorical sense of ethos. And his "pedant's stance" has · 
Elbow's "rubber-gloved quality" typical of "most academic discourses, 11 
the antithesis of Corder's "entertainer's stance" that contains a bit too 
much of "empty colorfulness." 
Both writers, despite their own differing ethos, promote in the 
content of their discourse mixtures of character and personality, mixtures 
that distinguish effective rhetoric. For Corder, ethos includes these 
considerations: 
It is more important for us to ask just 
how character is revealed in language, or 
just what qualities of character in par-
ticular reveal good sense, good character, 
and good will .... But since ethical argument 
appears to be contingent upon a presence 
emerging in discourse, the real voice [is] 
of a genuine personality ("Hunting" 300). 
For Berlin, ethos includes these considerations: 
A rhetoric can never be innocent, can 
never be a disinterested arbiter of the 
ideological claims of others because it 
is always already serving certain ideo-
logical claims .... The liberated conscious-
ness of students is the only educational 
objective worth considering ("Rhetoric and Ideology" 4 77). 
These rhetoricians, though opposite in their own ethos, tap at the 
core of the role of ethos in contemporary writing: writers must 
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assert themselves and cannot do so with ideological neutrality. Writers, 
ideally, should position themselves between the externality of Aristotle's 
objectivity and the internality of Plato's subjectivity. If polarized, writers 
run the risk of being either too distanced or too personal. 
11Neo-traditionalists11--those writers discussed in this chapter--have drawn 
from the past in developing what I think is an effective ethos that 
balances the self with subject and audience. 
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Such a balance, however, becomes precarious in the poststructural 
theories that have developed concurrently with the 11neo-traditionalist11 
strand of rhetoric. In the writings of Barthes, Foucaulti and 
Derrida--along with their American counterparts--ethos takes on a new 
meaning. In Chapter Four I will discuss the role of ethos in 
poststructural theory. 
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Chapter IV 
Poststructural Rhetoric: Is the Writer Dead? 
What matter who's speaking? 
Michel Foucault 
As I have suggested thus far in this study of the evolution of ethos 
from the classical period to the present, the presence of self in writing 
has been largely cyclical, rather than progressive in any chronological 
sense. Ethos, with its roots firmly planted in Aristotle, Plato, Quintilian, 
and Cicero, is reinterpreted . by the cultural and intellectual trends of a 
given period. 
For centuries ethos thrived as a dominant mode of appeal and 
perhaps as the most powerful of all means of persuasion. Historically, 
the principal argument among rhetoricians has not concerned the place 
or the power of ethos, but rather the objectivity or the subjectivity of the 
writer's rendering of reality. Meaning resided in the writer. Spanning the 
spectrum of time· from classical to modern rhetoric was the question of 
involvement concerning the authenticity of the writer's perception of his 
world. With Aristotle and Plato at either end of the objective-subjective 
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continuum, subsequent rhetoricians have staked their positions at points 
between the two. With this dichotomy rhetoricians generally fell into two 
camps of thought: Neo-Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic. 
Such division of thought, however, applied more to literature than to 
rhetoric. Writers were thought more to be authors, and readers were 
thought more to be critics. Personal exposition--essays--has not received 
the same attention as literature has. And for centuries critics drew a 
clear line between the two. This line, in addition to highlighting 
distinctions between rhetoric and literature, has contributed to the 
perceived superiority of literature, which has a history that sustains itself 
as an academic pursuit, giving credence to the belief that literature is a 
discipline worthy of lofty study. This observation of literature 
steeped in tradition with its own proper subject matter perhaps accounts 
for its esteemed position in English departments. We stress not readers 
of writers, but critics of literature. Whereas rhetoricians struggle in their 
efforts to locate and sustain a conceptual framework, literary critics have 
established a solid ground from which they can °locate" reality. M.H. 
Abrams, for instance, writes with authority in his classifications of 
literature, classifications drawn from the criterion of "orientation," or where 
the critic finds a literary work: 1) in the nature it copies; 2) in the 
audience it finds; 3) in the author; or, 4) in its own verbal structure. As 
he states more simply, literature can be classified as either mimetic, 
affective, expressive, or objective (Adams 1). 
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Though these distinctions are as rhetorical as they are literary. and 
though ethos could be clearly traced through this framework, rhetoricians 
tend towards timidity in staking their rightful claims. As I will propose in 
this chapter, however, literary and rhetorical theory merge in 
poststructural thinking to form a powerful new method that adds a new 
insight to rhetorical analyses that break down the traditional barriers 
between literature and rhetoric. Poststructuralism gives rhetoricians their 
rightful role in English departments, a role that has long been diminished 
in this century. 
However, before I proceed with my discussion of poststructuralism, 
I must first admit to two huge obstacles that stand in the way of a lucid 
discussion. First, poststructuralism defies lucidity; and second, applying 
. poststructuralist theory to the evolution of ethos in rhetoric is no small 
task. Yet, having scraped and scratched my way through the darkness 
of poststructuralism, I believe with conviction that somewhere in this 
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quagmire of thought lies the essence of ethos in contemporary theory. 
And though the term "deconstruction," an offshoot of poststructuralism, 
has an explosive ring of finality to it, it tends,· as I have come to 
understand it, to synthesize rather than destroy the theories that have 
preceded it. Obscure yet elucidating, poststructuralism forces us to look 
anew at the way we think, write, and read. Like a Gestalt picture, the 
longer we stare at it the greater the chance that it will snap in to 
complete focus. We see it both ways. Deconstruction is like this. 
What then is this deconstructive link between writing and reading 
and how is ethos affected by it? Though this theory is generally a 
reaction against structuralism--a reaction that I will more fully explain later 
in this chapter--for now I will digress to relate a personal understanding 
of deconstruction (a species of poststructuralism) and how this 
understanding became apparent in the classroom. 
For years I have taught an Introduction to Literature class, and for 
years I have left the course with the frustration that my students did not 
understand me, or, of greater significance, the text they read. Despite 
my efforts to "liberate" their thinking, to give them full reign in exploring 
the various ideas that good literature renders, I invariably found myself in 
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the same hole each semester. Students did not think for themselves; 
instead, they tried to second-guess the author's intention coupled with 
my interpretation of what I thought was the author's intention. This 
double-barrelled imitation produced papers twice-removed from any kind 
of personal response that would enhance the "understanding and 
appreciation" (the course's objective) of literature. However ostensibly I 
stated that I wanted their interpretations, their responses, and their 
personal engagement, to them the tacit message was clear: they must 
give me what I want. And I got what I asked for--stale, lifeless, canned 
"analyses" that said absolutely nothing. Even the sharper, more daring 
students stayed well within the lines of what they thought I wanted. The 
less ambitious resorted to plot summaries. 
What is the problem? In a phrase, the problem might be "critical 
orientation." Abrams and others have traditionally categorized literary 
criticism into the four schools mentioned earlier in this chapter: mimetic, 
affective, expressive, and objective. These classifications alone 
"construct" a particular kind of response that inhibits the kind of 
discovery we seek in literary analyses. Many teachers--and I am 
included--slip in and out of the four classical modes of criticism, never 
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satisfied with any one in and of itself. If I wanted personal responses, I 
would rely upon the affective school of literature, knowing all along that 
students would fall prey to the "affective fallacy. 11 Literature served more 
as a springboard to ideas by association, ideas that usually fell wide of 
the mark when students dipped into totally unrelated anecdotes about 
what the literature "reminded them of .11 
Expressive theory failed as well. Never really comfortable with this 
school of thought to begin with, I would nonetheless throw in what 
biographical tidbits I knew about a particular author. Invariably this 
backfired. Hemingway's drinking or Dickinson's sexual orientation or 
Hawthorne's politics would reign supreme in the students' eyes, blurring 
whatever else might be in the piece. Even Thoreau was labeled a "lazy 
bastard who would not know a value if it slapped him in the face." 
New Criticism seemed to be the solution. Reasonably 
well-schooled in this theory, I thought that an objective, structural 
analysis would keep students on track. No longer chit-chatty (affective) 
or gossipy (expressive), the course had content--real substance. I 
lectured about literary technique and terminology and insisted that the 
students dig out the meaning through the kind of close reading required 
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of structuralist thought. We symbol hunted, read between and over the 
lines, and found motifs in any phrase repeated twice. I reinvented the 
literary wheel with each new piece we encountered. I isolated plot, 
theme, character, setting, symbol, and the host of other terms with the 
turn of each page. I behaved, in short, as a new critic who emphasized 
the principles of Brooks and Warren: 
They paid attention to the text in 
itself, regardless of authorial 
motives or historical context; and 
they focused on the formal elements 
that they thought distinguished 
literature from non-literature .... 
It taught students to read carefully, 
to master the text, to pull from it 
the meaning they thought existed 
there objectively (Raymond 11). 
New criticism and current-traditional rhetoric are similar in their 
diminshment of ethos in the text. Ethos fades, surrendering itself in part 
to the scientific influences of objectivity, a type of external reality that the 
new criticism espoused. 
Deconstruction, however, places the reader/writer at the center of 
personal involvement. Jacques Derrida, the inventor of deconstruction, 
discusses 11binary opposites11 that .are the cornerstone of deconstructive 
thought. This concept of binary opposites is divided into two phases, 
the first of which "overturns, 11 the second of which 11reconstructs 11 : 
[overturning) To do justice to this 
necessity is to recognize that in a 
classical philosophical opposition 
we are not dealing with the peaceful 
coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but rather 
with a violent hierarchy. One of the 
two terms governs the other. To decon-
struct the opposition is to overturn the 
hierarchy at a given moment. 
[reconstructing] To remain in the first 
phase is still to operate on the terrain 
of and from within the deconstructed system. 
By means of this double ... we must also mark 
the interval between inversion, which brings 
low which was high, and the eruptive 
emergence of a new 'concept'(qtd.in Fink 65). 
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Derrida is hard to read, and, though I oversimplify his complex theories, I 
find his ideas about overturning and reconstructing understandable and 
practicable. This 11fifth 11 school of literary theory essentially collapses the 
previous four and frees in the process the literary constraints that inhibit 
reader response. 
His idea of "binary opposites," or "philosophical opposition," is the 
key to 11overturning11 previously held conceptions about the nature of 
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literature. To illustrate this point I will allude again to my example of 
teaching an Introduction to Literature class. With any of the established 
four critical schools of theory, I constrain student response (or my own 
for that matter) to the particular criteria of that critical school. In doing so 
the response is either mimetic, affective, expressive, or objective. 
Derrida's deconstruction dismantles these constraints. 
For example, Hawthorne's ''Young Goodman Brown" has been variously 
taught, consciously or not, using all of the four schools of thought. Such 
questions might follow from such a framework: Is this story "real" or not? 
(mimetic). How do you view Brown's plight? (affective). How does 
Hawthorne's background contribute to his writing of the story? 
(expressive). And, what recurring images, colors, or symbols reflect the 
theme of the story? (objective). Derrida would not have us think this 
way. Again, he would have us overturn and reconstruct. In other words, 
as I understand it, he is suggesting that we focus on the opposites in 
any given reading. ''Young Goodman Brown" is replete with opposites: 
good/evil; dark/light; real/unreal; innocence/corruption; and male/female, 
to name a few. Of course, none of these pairs exists without opposition, 
without "violence" as Derrida would say. The point of deconstruction, 
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then, is two-fold: identify the binary opposites, and reconstruct the new 
concept that emerges. 
This breaking down and rebuilding empowers the reader to render· 
a fresh and personal interpretation without the baggage of either 
self-delusion or standard critical rehash. This freedom, however, does 
not simplify the reading process, nor should it be misconstrued as a 
reckless form of interpretation that abandons the intellectual integrity that 
should exist between reader and writer. Poststructural analysis demands 
that the reader break down a piece--deconstruct it--to its central binary 
opposites, an activity that requires analysis, and then, equally important, 
the synthesis demands that the reader reconstruct the piece, creating 
new meaning in the process. In other words, the reader no longer 
breaks down a piece and searches for meaning in the fragments, as 
structuralism stresses; instead, the reader 11overturns11 a piece in 
identifying binary opposites, and then reconstructs it with this important 
distinction: which opposite prevails? 
Within these opposites lies Derrida's notion of 11violence. 11 
Deconstruction insists that the reader sense the struggle of philosophic 
assumptions within a text. This struggle evolves into conflict that, in 
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deconstructionist theory, produces a full-fledged battle where one side 
11overturns11 the other. In a deconstructionist framework, then, "Young 
Goodman Brown" becomes, for instance, a struggle between good and 
evil. Though, of course, traditional theories could render the same 
conclusion, deconstruction, through emphasis on polar opposites, forces 
readers to delineate the opposing terms and then determine which side 
prevails. Seen as a teeter-totter, these opposing terms, in this case good 
and evil, are not equally balanced. Depending upon active reader 
response, one side tilts the other. For sake of simplicity, I will assume 
that the majority of readers would agree that in ''Young Goodman Brown" 
evil tilts the balance. The fulcrum of analysis now requires that the 
reader rivet attention on the philosophic violence that pervades the piece. 
In doing so the reader not only draws upon traditional methods of 
support, but, in a sense, 11rewrites11 the piece with the resolution of conflict 
in mind. To extract from the piece that "evil is the nature of mankind" 
yields, perhaps, a superficial understanding, a passive knowledge. But to 
reconstruct the piece as seen as a struggle where one side prevails is to 
render it a personal and permanent experience drawn from the reader's 
active involvement. 
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Though I have focused on Hawthorne as my illustration, any piece 
of literature, poetry and essays included, subjects itself to a 
deconstructive reading. Readers of Kate Chopin, for instance, can 
discern the binary opposites of liberation/suppression or of 
morality/immorality. Joyce yields dark/light; Hemingway life/death; Frost 
engagement/disengagement; Dickinson reality/fantasy. The 
interpretations are as numerous as the readers. 
Jane Tompkins' "A Short Course in Poststructuralism" 
sheds light on the obscurity that clouds what Christopher Norris calls 
deconstruction: "[not] a method, a system or settled body of ideas" (1). 
Defining by negation, other critics go to great lengths in saying what 
deconstruction is not. Foucault himself defines it in Spellmeyer's words 
as "an activity rather than a body of knowledge" (715). Barthe says that 
"language is neither an instrument nor a vehicle," and asks the question 
''who writes?" (142). Others have called it "destabilizing, obscure, hazy, 
and unduly dyadic" (Schilb 423). 
Poststructuralism, Tompkins says, is "a challenge to the accepted 
model of reading and of criticism" (733). Reviewing the traditional model 
of literary criticism, Tompkins says it "puts in the number one spot the 
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reader, in the number two spot the method, in the number three spot the 
text, and in the number four spot the reading" (733). Like Abrams' 
classifications, such categories tend to dissect, rather than synthesize, 
the interpretation of the text. Tompkins notes that the "significance of the 
poststructural model is that it collapses all four of these entities into a 
simultaneity, into a single, continuous act of interpretation [so that] all 
are part of a single, evolving field of discourse" (733). 
The significance of Tompkins' interpretation of poststructuralist 
theory lies in its relevance to composition. Though poststructural theory, 
with its primary emphasis on the collapsing of traditional methods of 
literary analysis, has an avant-garde appeal to literary theorists, 
rhetoricians have scrambled to make sense of its significance in the 
writing classroom. The challenge of what I would call poststructural 
rhetoric, however, involves the murkiness of interpreting what exactly 
poststructuralism is. Clearly enough, I think, poststructuralism is a 
reaction against the structuralist movement that took hold early in the 
twentieth century. Rhetoric, seeking to identify itself as a solid 
and clear-cut discipline, sought to imitate the exactitude of science that 
emerged at the beginning of this century. As Jon Harned notes, 
Recent studies have shown that the 
freshman English course as it was 
taught in American universities from 
the late nineteenth century until the 
mid 1960's took its governing assumptions 
from the empiricist epistemology of 
the Newtonian tradition in science (10). 
. With this scientific metaphysics firmly ensconced in educational circles, 
structuralism in literary criticism seemed to be a logical response to 
those empiricists who found English too vague, too nebulous, and too 
"unscientific" to be worthy of academic pursuit. The structuralists 
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developed their crisply delineated schools of literary theory in hopes that 
such division would create the kind of objectivity that would put literature 
on a level field with science. As Tompkins points out, literature was 
neatly categorized into the four entities of reader, method, text, and 
interpretation, with the objectivity of text holding the key position (733). 
With machine-like precision, a reader entered a piece, absorbed its 
content, and came out the other end having understood (or by a fault of 
his own not having understood) what the author meant. 
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This emphasis, of course, deflates the signficance of both the 
reader and the writer. Communication is restricted to knowable, 
objective realities where language is relegated to the subservient position 
of a mere medium of exchange. Ideas, accordingly, must have precise, 
corresponding words that equate meaning and understanding. To the 
extent that this correspondence is not achieved, the writer fails--or the 
reader fails in his comprehension of what the writer intended to say. 
This structuralist mode of univocal meaning between writer and 
reader--the essence of current-traditional rhetoric--serves as the major 
point of departure between structural and poststructural theory. 
Derrida and fellow deconstructionists raise a point that confounds 
contemporary rhetoricians. Deconstructionists generally call into 
question the relationship of nature, thought, and language--into what 
Ferdinand de Saussure called the "signified" and the "signifier." 
But before I proceed with what I understand are the basic principles 
of deconstruction--principles that began with de Saussure and that were 
expanded by Derrida, Foucault, and numerous American rhetoricians--! 
need first to step back and attempt to clarify as well as I can the clouds 
of confusion that have resulted from deconstructionist thinking. In 
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doing so I will sort out the strands of deconstruction that have woven 
their way through the myriad interpretations of what has come to be 
called the New Rhetoric. In this sorting out, I hope not only to illuminate 
some of the darkness that distinguishes deconstruction, but also to 
relocate the role of ethos as it stands today. 
Deconstruction, an off-shoot of poststructuralism, seeks among 
other matters to merge composition and literary theories. Writing and 
reading, as reasoning would have it, are opposite sides of the same 
coin. Expanding this logic, it would follow that we read as we write and 
write as we read. When we write, we "construct" texts. When we read, 
we 11deconstruct11 texts. In a rhetorical sense, we "compose" and 
"decompose." The essence of deconstruction involves this interaction of 
writer and reader. Simply stated, the basic question might be this one: 
'Whose text is it, the writer's or the reader's?" 
Deconstruction addresses this question, and, in doing so, adds a 
dimension that transcends the simplicity of the writer-reader interaction. 
This dimension of difference is the source, however, of multiple 
interpretations--and of multiple doubts, several of which surface in· 
Schilb's "Composition and Poststructuralism. 11 Schilb, wondering first 
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whether we should "strenuously reject this perspective [deconstruction], 
mildly tolerate it, guardedly encourage it, or utterly embrace it, 11 cites 
others on this issue: 
Jim Corder ... [sees it] as a destabilizing 
force within language itself. Ross Winter-
owd has scorned J. Hillis Miller's effort 
to relate deconstruction to the teaching 
of writing. Ann Berthoff has faulted 
poststructuralism for what she takes to 
be its unduly dyadic conception of the 
sign. C. Jan Swearingen has charged it 
with a radical skepticism that deters 
the promotion of literacy. [And] Maxine 
Hairston has suggested that younger 
composition scholars espousing post-
structuralism just want to please their 
mentors in literature (423). 
Indeed, the overriding question coming from the 1966 Conference on 
College Composition and Communication was, "how can deconstruction 
possibly help us" (Schilb 424). 
Though I certainly do not have the definitive and final answer to this 
question, I do believe that deconstruction reestablishes the long tradition 
of rhetoric and the role that ethos plays in that tradition. Ironically, 
despite various proclamations that the writer dies in deconstruction, I 
maintain that the writer reasserts_himself as a living, 
breathing entity, even though, as Foucault would have it, he must 
transform himself from author to writer to do so: "the author has 
disappeared; God and man died a common death; we should 
reexamine the empty space left by the author's disappearance" (182). 
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In strange twists, the author's disappearance may be more of a 
restoration of the proper balance among text, writer, reality, and reader. 
Far more attention has been given to the 1963 Conference on College 
Composition and Communication that featured the innovations of 
Corbett, Christensen, and Booth--innovations that largely advocated 
personal writing as the antidote to the lifeless themes of the 1950's and 
to the authoritarian educational and social system that stifled 
individuality. However, the lesser known conference at Johns Hopkins 
University may have done more to overthrow the structuralist constraints 
that have dominated rhetoric since 1875. Arguably, despite all the 
positive dialogue that emerged from the 1963 convention from the likes 
of Corbett, Booth, Christensen, Elbow, Macrorie, and a host of others, 
the basic paradigm of western metaphysics remained unchanged: 
language, according to Harned, "still sought to convey a reality that 
existed outside language itself" (10). 
Before I delve deeper into the nebula of deconstruction and its 
relevance to composition, I must first summarize the larger 
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significance of what has occurred regarding the role of ethos in rhetoric. 
As I have maintained throughout this work, rhetoric has its primary roots 
in Aristotle and Plato, roots that were refined by Cicero and Quintilian. 
For simplicity's sake, I categorized Aristotle and Cicero as advocating an 
ethos that stressed the appearance of good character. In this respect, 
rhetoric had pragmatic as well as aesthetic purposes. I further 
categorized Plato and Quintilian as advocating an ethos that equated 
character with ethos. Non-virtuous people could not be good writers; 
ethos, and the virtues it elicits, could not be feigned in the manner 
described by Aristotle and Cicero. 
These basic classical strands have woven their way through the 
history of rhetoric, with only the emphases of ethos shifting one way or 
the other. Germane to my discussion, however, is the point that the 
writer and his perception of reality remained at the forefront of rhetoric. 
Readers remained outside the work in that they were either persuaded 
by the ethos of Aristotle's rhetoric or they were inspired by the ethos of 
Plato's rhetoric. 
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These strands have remained for some two thousand years. But 
with the advent of composition at Harvard in 1875, which 11standardized 11 
the teaching of writing, coupled with the Industrial Revolution, which 
brought forth massive social, cultural, and political changes, these basic 
strands were severed. For the sake of convenience, I have marked the 
diminishment of ethos as occurring between the years 1875 and 1963. 
The individual was lost in the haze of mechanized writing that has been 
variously characterized throughout this work and has been labelled as 
current-traditional rhetoric. 
It is ironic, though, that current-traditionalists generally 
identify themselves as neo-Aristotelians. To a point, of course, they are 
correct in that Aristotle emphasized, in Berlin's words, 11a reality that is 
rational, regular, and certain, 11 and a knowledge that II is readily 
accessible because of the consonance between the world and the 
faculties of the mind11 (Berlin, 11Current-Traditional 11 1), but they neglect or 
at least distort Aristotle's extensive views on the role of ethos in 
projecting this version of reality (and they totally ignore his insistence on 
invention). 
A similar distortion exists with neo-Platonists who define reality as 
an ethereal entity that is unattainable excepting the meagerness 
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of copies of copies. If discovery of the true self is the aim of 
neo-Platonists, a truth on which language is loosely hung, then ethos 
becomes exclusively the self revealed--a self in search of truth without 
any reality beyond the perceptions of the individual writer. The distortion 
here is that neo-Platonists, though emphasizing the self in writing, do not 
ignore reality or language. Composition under the guise of 
nee-Platonism is not written in a vacuum void of subject, purpose, or 
audience. 
My digression here--a summation of the basic tenets of classical 
rhetoric and the role of ethos played in each--serves as a foundation for 
discussing the shifting paradigms that emerged in the 1960's. I assert, 
that for all the good that arose from the 1963 convention and its attempt 
to reestablish itself in writing, little was accomplished beyond a 
tampering with the basic western metaphysical communications triangle 
of writer, audience, and reality. Reality, in other words, was still 
something "out there." 
The primary difference exists in how far or near the writer stood in 
relation to the presented external reality. The assertion of self, 
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though liberating on the one hand, is, on the other hand, still inhibiting in 
that the self is constrained by an objective reality and by the language 
used to convey it. 
I do not intend to denigrate the ideas of Elbow, Booth, Christensen 
and others who convened in 1963 to give new direction to our discipline. 
I remain convinced, indeed, that without their influence composition 
would still be steeped in a voiceless mode that has distinguished writing 
since 1875. What I am suggesting, however, is that nothing much new 
came from what has been hailed as a revolution; it was more of a 
restoration--a restoration of ethos in the wider scheme of rhetoric. 
If there was a battlefield during this period, as has been generally 
said,· it was not between the conservative neo-Aristotelians and their 
brand of current-traditional rhetoric, which, as I have indicated is a 
misnomer, and the liberal neo-Platonists and their brand of 
expressionism, which is equally a misnomer. The battle, as it were, was 
more of a pedagogical one. than a philosophical one. How composition 
should be taught was the prevailing question that emerged from this era. 
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And the answers, from Booth's rhetorical stance to Christensen's 
generative rhetoric to Mellon's sentence combining to Burke's pentad, 
have all positively affected the teaching of composition. In short, ethos 
was revived and techniques were invented. But the metaphysics--the 
underlying philosophic assumptions about the relationships of language, 
thought, and reality--remained largely the same. However, 
deconstruction, based on Derrida's distinction of "metaphysics of 
presence, 11 radically shifted the fundamental ways in which we view the 
role of language in reading and writing. 
Reality, conventionally, has been thought of as an entity that exists 
"out there," separate from the writer. Historically, rhetoric, in its broadest 
terms, has sought to establish the connection between the writer, the 
reader, and this external reality. Despite differences between Aristotle 
and Plato, their perceptions of the physical world had more similarities 
than differences. Both metaphysics had as their premise the writer's aim 
to "capture" meaning. Meaning, in this respect, was determinate in that 
written expression should have a conclusive, univocal interpretation that 
united the writer and reader. Misunderstanding was the result of 
misinterpretation. Some readers_simply do not "get it. 11 As Sharon 
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Crowley states, traditional metaphysics presents a kind of 11self-sealing 
argument11 regarding the relationship of the mind, reality, and language: 
minds correctly perceive and experience 
the world because they have a natural 
representative relation to it. Further, 
minds create language, which must perforce 
represent nature ... since language is a 
mental production, and thus a product of 
nature ... [minds] literally 're-present' 
[nature ]--make it present to us, give it 
to us again, perfect and undistorted. 
Minds 'picture' nature (Crowley 3). 
And language is the vehicle for this 11picturing 11 of reality, or, as 
Crowley adds, 11reality is enshrined in the structure of language11 (3). 
Derrida, though, flips this around. As Crowley suggests, Derrida 
might argue that traditional metaphysical thought about the tidy 
alignment of language, thought, and reality has it 11precisely backwards, 
or upside down, or inside out" (4). Consciousness, in other words, does 
not produce language, but, rather, language produces consciousness. 
As Crowley further states, 11language speaks us" (4). The essence, then, 
of Derrida's metaphysics of presence is the philosophic assumption that 
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language, again in Crowley's words, is 11transparent rather than-opaque, 
[which] must assume that language has no originary or creative powers 
of its own .... lt is only instrumental, forever dependent on some other 
generative force for its motivation" (5). In other words, nothing exists 
independent of itself; in language, symbols are meaningless without 
context--they require, or are dependent on, this other 11generative force" 
that Derrida calls 11differance, 11 a play on words that captures the essence 
of deconstruction. A French pun, this word merges "different" and 
11deferred11 in suggesting that all writing is not a matter of sameness and 
that all writing must, by its very nature, be distanced from the _context of 
one human being communicating simultaneously with another. In other 
words, contrary to the conventional western metaphysical theories of 
communication--that language has a referent--Derrida's metaphysics of 
presence refutes the idea that language can transcend itself in conveying 
ideas between writer and reader. Writing, in this sense, is different and 
deferred as my simple example here might illustrate. 
I am presently sitting alone in my office at Northern Oklahoma 
College on Sunday morning, December eleventh, 1994, and the time 
now is exactly 8:26 a.m. This past sentence, an utterance in Derrida's 
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vernacular, is now in the past tense, as time continues to 
tick away. The 11presence11 of this communication is already 11distanced,11 
and this distance will increase over the span of time. Theoretically, and 
again borrowing from deconstructive language, I, the writer of this piece, 
am currently actively writing language that dies the moment I write it. If 
this text is read ~fter my metaphorical or physical death, then I have 
authored a piece that renders life to the reader--but my presence is 
gone. 
Additionally, these utterances called language cannot have, 
according to Derrida, any reference outside the markings that the reader 
sees presently in this text. The reader sees these markings at the time 
he sees them, not at the current time of 8:43 a.m. Furthermore, during 
this seventeen-minute span in the writing of this paragraph, the reader 
has been totally absent both in time and in the ability to respond to what 
I am saying. My communication, written to unknown audiences in 
unknown places in unknown times, refutes the very meaning that 
language is a medium of understanding between the writer and the 
reader. I, the writer, have no idea that these markings will ever be read, 
much less understood. In other _words, I am now able to assert in the 
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presence of absence. 11Reality, 11 or language's ability to create it, is 
non-existent. My task is no longer to capture an external reality through 
the medium of language--an 11out there 11 referent; nor is it to project an 11in 
here11 version of my own world in mere want of a reader who wishes. to 
engage me. 
Absurd, perhaps, but deconstruction--at least Derrida's brand of 
it--can be so variously construed that it either totally liberates or 
completely suppresses the role of ethos in writing. But Derrida is not a 
rhetorical outlaw writing on the fringes of absurdity. He is rather, in 
many respects, a disciple of Plato, whose pronouncements on rhetoric 
were just as radical in his day as Derrida's are today. If we are to take 
Plato seriously, as well we should, then I would argue that we should 
take Derrida seriously. But to accept either is to reject an aspect of our 
discipline--that writing is a form of communication through language that 
seeks truth (or the appearance of it) to an audience within a referential 
framework. As Jasper Neel points out, 11Plato undeniably condemns 
writing 11 (1). And, as was more fully pointed out in chapter two, Plato, as 
quoted by Neel, goes on to say that 11any serious student of serious 
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realities will shrink from making truth the helpless object of men's ill-will 
by committing it to writing" (1). 
Neel contends, however, that Plato is 'wrong about writing, and his 
error is compounded because he uses writing to make his case" (5). 
Plato needed writing to condemn it. As Neel further states,· "Plato could 
stand under the plane tree beside the llissus and shout as loudly as he 
liked; the only way we 'hear' him today is in writing" (3). 
Though I have contended elsewhere in this paper that the lines 
separating current-traditionalists, with their roots in Aristotle, from 
expressionists, with their roots in Plato, are really blurry distinctions of 
pedagogy, Derrida and his deconstructive theory bring forth the central 
shift in thinking about composition. My point here is that the shift is 
philosophic, not pedagogical. Plato, like Derrida, is less a 
rhetorician than he is a philosopher. Seekers of knowledge, beauty, and 
truth, philosophers quarrel over the meaning of life and our purpose in it. 
With these ideals, Derrida (who studied and taught philosophy) was 
indeed influenced by Plato, Nietzsche, and Saussure, among others. 
Though my intention here is not to diminish philosophic contributions to 
rhetoric, I think that we must bear in mind a primary difference between 
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the two: philosophy is largely conceptual, while rhetoric is largely 
pragmatic. 
Deconstruction, I think, forces us to look at the paradigms that have 
formed our discipline, and, in doing so, we can effectively 11reconstruct11 
from the ground up what we do and how we do it. As Theresa Enos 
notes, we must approach poststructuralist theory with the following 
objectives in mind: 
1) to broaden thinking about literature 
not only to include the discursive 
nature of language but also to accept 
its persuasive nature. 
2) to attempt distinctions between author 
and writer. 
3) to acknowledge the presence of the writer 
in the text itself. 
4) to embrace the concept of the world as 
language (339). 
Though Enos' points pertain more to literature than they do to 
composition, the correlation between literature and composition, long 
held as separate entities in departments of English (as well as in the 
minds of students), narrows in deconstructive theory. In fact, general 
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poststructural theory blurs the conventional distinctions between 
literature and composition, and, paradoxically, from this blur emerges the 
clarity of the writer's role in poststructural/deconstructive theory. Ethos, 
in summary, emerges as an essential force in the new rhetoric. Enos' 
last two points about the presence of the writer and the concept of 
language are especially essential to the role of ethos in deconstructive 
theory. 
Enos, of course, like others who interpret the nebula of 
deconstruction with varying shades of differences, simplifies to a degree 
what I think Derrida and Foucault meant by presence and language. To 
them, despite their disagreements about deconstruction, writers and 
language both serve as rather inadequate means of communication. 
Derrida's refutation of the metaphysics of presence refutes this 
direct correlation. My words, chosen and presented here, do not 
transcend the here and now, nor do they defer the reader to anything 
outside the presence of now. In this deconstructive sense, I disappear 
with each word written, leaving mere traces for unknown readers to 
discover long after this moment of thought--thought inadequately 
represented by black marks on a page and thought restricted to what I 
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can say through duplication of signifiers. In other words, at this moment 
I am thinking far more than I am writing. My ethos is constrained, is 
11deconstructed11 by the nihilistic nature of poststructural theory. 
This reduction of the speaker/writer to insignificance accords with 
Foucault's notion that it matters not who's speaking, and liberates the 
writer to create whatever realities he can, knowing, as he goes, that he 
metaphorically dies in the process. Writers are, in Foucault's words, 
11freed from the necessity of 'expression,' it [writing] only refers to itself' 
(180). Foucault further expounds upon the significance of the 
insignificance of the writer: 
Writing unfolds like a game that inevitably 
moves beyond its own rules and finally leaves 
them behind. Thus, the essence of this 
writing is not the exalted emotions related 
to the act of composition or the insertion 
of a subject into language. Rather, it is 
primarily concerned with creating an opening 
where the writing subject endlessly disappears (180). 
I seek closure that Derrida says does not exist. I have preceded this text 
and stand outside of it. Yet I am here if the reader finds me. I must 
conclude that I am alive through the language I 11recreate11 (I have no 
original language that serves to ~ignify a greater truth--to this extent 
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deconstruction is perfectly understandable). And the language I recreate 
came long before me and the words I use are in the dictionary available 
to anyone. 
In conclusion (which in itself is a refutation of deconstructive 
theory), I must admit that all I have written thus far is non-
deconstructive. Contrary to whatever efforts I have expended in writing 
deconstructively, I have nonetheless abided by the conventions of 
structural rhetoric. To what extent I have 11succeeded11 remains a decision 
to be made by the reader, but I have attempted to write with a purpose, 
a subject, and an audience, and have attempted to do so with clarity, 
correctness, and organization. I have also tried to insert a sense of self 
throughout this paper, especially in light of my thesis of surveying the 
evolution of ethos in rhetoric. 
Philosophically, poststructuralism forces rhetoricians to look anew at 
the relationships among reality, thought, and language. It further 
enhances and defines the classical roots from which. writing sprung, 
clarifying in the process much of what Aristotle, Plato, and 
their followers expounded upon. Additionally, poststructuralism makes 
an earnest attempt to dismantle the metaphysics of western thinking--a 
task that is nearly impossible, as this chapter has no doubt indicated. 
And finally, poststructuralism, despite its efforts to the contrary, gives 
voice to the writer. To coin my version of Descarte, I write; therefore I 
am. 
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Pedagogically, poststructuralism crackles on thin ice. Though I 
have no philosophic qualms about poststructural theory, and though I 
find it stimulating to look at the world upside down, I nonetheless cling to 
the familiar in finding safe ground between the reality of Aristotle and of 
Plato. For better or worse, writers, at least writers in our contemporary 
culture, must master the conventions of communication as they have 
evolved from classical times. 
Chapter V 
Pedagogical Applications: Practice in Projecting Ethos As a Role 
in Discourse 
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A writer's self-consciousness, for which he is much scorned, is really a 
mode of interestedness that inevitably turns outward. 
John Updike 
The theory of ethos in composition involves an intriguing history of 
the ebb and flow of the voice in writing. The sounds of self seem to 
surface, even shout, then submerge into depths of silence. Currently, as 
I have suggested in the theoretical chapters of this study, we are seeking 
to rediscover the proper role-the right pitch--for ethos in composition. 
But classroom practice can dampen the enthusiasm of the brightest of 
scholars who espouse the multiple philosophies that address the nebula 
surrounding the self in composition. Ethereal, murky, and slippery are but 
a few of the adjectives that come to my mind in describing ethos in written 
discourse. 
During my year's writing of this study, I have spent 720 hours in 
classrooms teaching writing to 35.6 students, a sizable portion of whom left 
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my course in about the same shape they entered it. Though I would like 
to report otherwise, the best of theories can flop come Monday morning 
when the bell rings and the door shuts. Yet, from my experience, I have 
noticed a glimmer of light that pushes me onward in my efforts to lay claim 
as a top gun in my business, albeit self-proclaimed and with but a sliver of 
recognition, the shards of which scatter with the winds of time. 
My building, Central Hall, is over a hundred years old, and late in the 
night I wander the empty halls squinting at the ghosts of teachers past who 
taught in their own clouds of chalkdust in the very rooms that I do--all of 
whom probably thought that they were in the midst of a maelstrom of 
theory that was the panacea for the ills of poor writing. They and their 
students have long since departed to the world of obscurity. 
These journeys down the dark, quiet halls of Central, punctuated by 
the echoes of my footsteps, remind me of my own insignificance--of a 
distance that lends perspective. Rumor even has it that one professor, 
lathered in the frenzy of the evolution of ethos in discourse, went berserk 
and leaped head-first from the steeple that adorns our building. Worse yet, 
legend has it, nobody cared. 
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Ruminations aside, my optimism lies with my observation that a 
growing number of students do write better when they themselves are at 
the center of their composition. Granted, not all will profit by such a 
pedagogy, but these captive charges trudging through the perceived 
irrelevance of required composition would slip between the cracks of any 
approach. 
But through my years of study and experience, I have come to this 
conclusion: Composition I should stress correctness; Composition II 
should stress effectiveness. Though this line of demarcation is etched in 
sand because some writers are ready to take risks in Comp I, I have found 
that the vast majority. of students have not mastered the basics necessary 
for effective writing, which include grammar, punctuation, and structure. 
With these distinctions in mind--correctness and effectiveness--! begin 
both my Composition I and Composition II course with this essay from 
Jasper Neel's Plato. Derrida, and Writing: 
Three Reasons for Stopping X 
X is one of the most important problems in 
today's modern society. There are three reasons 
why X should be stopped. This essay will explain 
those reasons. 
First, a lot of people do X because it is the 
popular thing to do. They do not realize how harm-
ful it can be in their later lives. All young people 
should realize that the best thing to do is to have 
fun later when it will last. Doing the popular thing 
now because it is fun is a big mistake, because this 
sort of thing doesn't last. 
Second, a lot of people don't realize that taking the 
easy way now is a bad idea. The way to have a bright 
future that will last is to work hard now and wait until 
later to X. For example, Horatio Alger did not X a lot 
when he was young. Instead, he worked hard for a bright 
future, and he ended up with a wonderful family, a good 
job, a lot of money, and a beautiful home. 
Third, the Bible says young people should not X. The 
Bible has been around a lot longer than those who X. If 
young people will be patient like Job was and if they work 
hard like he did, they will end up with children and all 
the good things life has to offer. 
In conclusion, I feel that people should not X. We 
should elect leaders and hire teachers who do not X. 
Because Xis popular, and the easy way, and against 
the Bible, you can see X should be stopped. 
Neel's 11translation11 is also worth noting in its entirety: 
I am not writing. I hold no position. I have 
nothing at all to do with discovery, communication, 
or persuasion. I care nothing about the truth. What 
I am is an essay. I announce my beginning, my parts, 
my ending, and the links between them. I announce 
myself as sentences correctly punctuated and words 
correctly spelled. 
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Clearly this example exemplifies the kind of dull, voiceless prose 
that conveys correctness at the cost of effectiveness. And though Neel's 
point is that this essay says nothing, which is true, it nonetheless does 
illustrate proper grammar, punctuation, and structure. These emphases are 
no small tasks: students should know, even memorize, the rules that 
govern language. Effectiveness is predicated on correctness. But this 
essay marks the end of Composition I and the beginning of Composition 
II. 
Students can, I think, learn the basics of composition: grammar, 
punctuation, and standard essay organization, though, truth to tell, and 
despite my better efforts, students have left my Composition I course 
unable or unwilling to string together a complete thought that ends with a 
period. For reasons I know not, some students lack the linguistic fluency 
that is required in written expression. But such thoughts as these go 
beyond the scope of this study. 
I will assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the majority of 
students have sufficient writing ability at the conclusion of a Composition 
I course. With this assumption, I begin Composition II once again with 
Neel's "Three Reasons for Stopping X11 essay. This time, however, I use it 
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as a point of departure. Like a Betty Crocker recipe, I say, you can tape 
this essay to your refrigerator and churn out indeterminate numbers of 
essays, substituting whatever you wish in place of X. What was correct in 
Composition I becomes ineffective in Composition II. As Neel points out, 
discovery, communication, and persuasion are absent in his idea of 
11antiwriting. 11 And ethos, I assert, is the catalyst for these emphases. 
The challenge of having students assert themselves in writing, 
however, is a nettlesome task. And though I offer no final solution for 
engaging students in their writing, I have found that some methods have 
worked for me in the past several years, methods that I continue to develop 
and refine. 
First, I establish from the outset that the first ten minutes of every 
class period we write without stopping (I sit in the back of the class and 
maintain my own journal). I further tell them that I expect a page of ink, or 
about 150 or so words. This task they do--surprisingly well. I have even 
reached the pleasant point where if I should forget the free-writing, they, to 
a class, remind me. This method, I think, serves two important functions: 
one, it sets the right tone for a writing class; and, two, it frees their pens 
and minds in the much needed physical act of putting words on paper. I 
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would further add that I do not read what they write, but that I do monitor 
their writing through simple observation. 
As for topics, I keep them open-ended, though I encourage ideas that 
relate the writers with discovering, exploring, and evaluating themselves with 
the world about them. Even though the topics are of their choosing, I 
provide them a heuristic at the beginning of the course of broad areas 
including spirituality, places/things, work, strengths/weaknesses, groups, 
and people. From these headings, I encourage students to narrow and 
refine. From this mode of invention students begin to understand the 
power of their own ethos. Additionally, such writing provides the ·students 
with a reservoir of ideas which they can draw upon for their formal essays. 
In terms of the curriculum for Composition II, I divide the course into 
roughly three segments: personal writing, persuasive writing, and research 
writing. However, I keep ethos at the forefront in any classification of 
writing. In establishing and maintaining this focus I attempt to create at the 
outset an ambience, an attitude, that suggests my seriousness about the 
craft of writing. And although I hesitate to proselytize about teacher 
demeanor, or in any way suggest that I emanate an aura that inspires the 
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kind of committed writing that I think is effective, I do believe that a 
teacher's attitude is essential to a writing class. I must emphasize, however, 
that to whatever extent I lack the demeanor critical to a writing class, I 
nonetheless find this rather ethereal entity perhaps the most important 
distinguishing characteristic in separating good classes from great classes. 
Theories, methodologies, textbooks, lesson plans, or technology can 
supplement, but cannot supplant, the interaction that must occur between 
writers and teachers. Writers must trust and respect their writing teachers; 
and writing teachers must trust and respect their writers. Without this 
mutual bond, writers will hold back and revert to their old ways of 
generating sterile prose. They will not serve themselves up, as good ethos 
requires, to a teacher for whom they lack trust and respect. 
And this rapport is the hard part. I cannot explain it--perhaps it is 
age, gender, physical appearance (attire, height, weight, posture), 
vocabulary, accent, or mannerisms--but it exists, and it makes all the 
difference. In a word, though, it is the ethos of the teacher that ignites the 
ethos of the writer. 
From experience (I don't know if a teacher's ethos can be taught in 
the school of education), I have bad some success and much failure at 
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striking the right ethos in my classes. My years of evaluations run the 
gamut of student responses ranging from ''you are the worst teacher I've 
ever had," to ''you are the greatest teacher I've ever had." Though I prefer 
the latter, I know that both extremes are off the mark; and I know too that 
for the many students who take composition for the requirement that it is, 
no teacher can make the connection necessary for writers to shine through 
with sterling prose. But to reiterate, students write differently to different 
writing teachers, and say what we will about audiences, for student writers, 
the teacher is the audience. And if ethos is our aim, then we must 
understand and project our own if we expect the same in return. 
Beyond the free writing, the general curriculum, and the projection of 
my own ethos, I spend considerable time setting the table, as it were, with 
philosophic discussions that tap into their perception of themselves and the 
world about them. Although I challenge their thinking throughout the 
semester, I devote several class periods at the outset of the course 
addressing specific philosophic questions that address the connection 
between 11knowers 11 and "writers, 11 a distinction that I first encountered at an 
English conference in 1991 . Joanne Kurfiss of Santa Clara University gave 
a presentation entitled "Knowers as Writers/Writers as Knowers, 11 the gist of 
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which draws the parallels between thinking and writing. Without going into 
the depth of detail she discussed, I nonetheless find it important to present 
the crux of her information that I paraphrase as follows: 
Perspective I: As knowers--
1) Have uncomplicated view of reality; polarized thinking; 
believe things are clearly true or false; do not question 
personal beliefs. 
2) Believe that knowledge is factual information; consequently, 
learn by reading and listening for facts rather than meaning. 
Expect to be tested on facts rather than concepts, interpretations, 
or ideas. 
3) Trust the 11voice of authority11 (parents, professors, printed 
word)--not peers. Learn by absorbing 11truth11 from 11authorities. 11 
4) Are intolerant of ambiguity; want others to 11say what they 
mean. 11 Perceive qualified language as confusing or sign of 
wishy-washiness. 
5) Learning is quantitative: how many pages of reading are 
required? How long should the paper be? Have no standards 
to judge what is important. 
Perspective I: As writers--
1) May offer facts and details with little interpretation; 
simplistic, single-factor solutions to complex problems. 
2) May use dogmatic, moralistic rhetoric; may blame or scold 
those with whom they disagree. 
3) Present facts to 11prove11 their view is correct with little 
regard for alternative interpretations. 
4) Try to write by formula (outline, five-paragraph essay). 
Organize writing by putting all related facts together 
with no clear purpose or point. 
5) Want clear statement of what is expected. Believe effort, 
quantity, and accuracy should determine grade. 
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This perspective, I think, establishes the clear connection between the 
way the majority of our students think, and, by extension, the way they 
write. With this correlation, ethos is muffled. A second perspective, 
however, provides a framework that can drive students towards a more 
open-minded approach that requires that ethos come to the forefront of 
their writing. 
Perspective II: As knowers--
1) Believe knowledge is indeterminate, value-laden, and is 
constructed by fallible human beings. 
2) Perceive knowledge as an ongoing, social, constructive 
process, a search for understanding rather than a pos-
session of facts. 
3) Are willing to make responsible choices and commitments 
based on analysis, judgment, and acknowledged values. 
4) Are able to go outside given frames of reference to pose 
questions, identify problems, and examine basic assumptions. 
5) Can integrate 11inner and outer11 voices into an authentic 
personal voice. 
Perspective II: As writers--
1) Can recognize cultural and historical context from which 
they can position themselves from other possibilities. 
2) Can identify and evaluate assumptions of competing 
perspectives and interpretations. 
3) Can identify values and ethical perspectives under-
lying a dispute, and can present an issue in complex 
terms, propose distinctions, invent new categories, 
and synthesize ideas. 
4) Can reason dialectically, taking into account all 
relevant reasons and evidence in support of views 
that differ from their own. 
5) Can understand that writing is a complex process that 
generates as well as displays understanding. 
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This perspective, contrary to the first, clearly promotes the kind of 
engaged, committed, persuasive writing that emphasizes ethos as the 
cornerstone of composition. And although l must admit that the 
presentation of these two perspectives does not pry open ironclad minds, 
it does nonetheless provide students with a sort of self-analysis from which 
they can better see themselves as thinkers and writers. Equally important, 
these perspectives provide me with an insight into how my students think. 
As a generality, those thinkers steeped either in a scientific mindset or in no 
particular mindset at all fit the first perspective; and those thinkers, rare 
though they be, that are open to the possibilities of the second perspective 
tend to be more receptive to ethos-based composition. 
The challenge thus becomes nudging students from perspective l to 
perspective II, or from an external to an internal view of reality as di.scussed 
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in the theoretical chapters of this study. Distance and objectivity render a 
degree of comfort; closeness and subjectivity shatter, I think, the wall that 
writers build between themselves and their audience. 
In addition to the methods I have discussed, the ethos I create, and 
the philosophy I espouse, I still must provide a pedagogy that promotes the 
emergence of self in writing. As I have noted throughout this chapter, 
students are hesitant to "expose" themselves. Examples help in alleviating 
their resistance. I have found that the essays written in Newsweek's "My 
Turn" column are especially effective in demonstrating the power of self in 
composition. These essays, one page in length, provide accessibility, 
relevance, and a reading level commensurate with their comprehension, 
rather than the classical essays that too frequently confuse, intimidate, or 
bore them. I do, however, depending upon the class, have success with 
E.B. White's "Once More to the Lake" and George Orwell's "Shooting an 
Elephant, 11 though these essays are far more challenging than the "My Turn" 
essays. 
These essays, as the title suggests, are personally engaged essays 
that address an array of issues from non-professional writers. With ease I 
can duplicate and distribute these essays whenever I deem them 
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appropriate for class analysis and discussion. If students find the essays 
appealing, I save them in a file; if they do not, which is frequently the case, 
I discard them. 
I have found over the past two years that three essays in particular 
invariably elicit a favorable response--essays that I will briefly discuss here. 
Before I proceed, though, I should note that the class has been introduced 
to the rhetorical principles that I have discussed thus far: they have an 
awareness of their philosophic orientation, understand the rhetorical stance, 
(Booth's concept of subject, purpose, and audience), and know the 
significance of ethos in effectively engaged prose. From this point I have 
found that students can successfully analyze an essay with ethos as the 
primary criterion. Although, of course, we discuss other rhetorical 
principles, we focus on the writer--at least at the outset. 
With this primary emphasis, I seek pieces that are more personal than 
they are argumentative. For example, John Monahan wrote a piece in the 
"My Turn11 column entitled 'When the Cold Wind Blows, 11 a poignant piece 
about the pain, loneliness, depression, and reaffirmation of the writer 
following a divorce. Essential to this topic, however, is the writer's 
projection of his ethos. He is not, for example, confessional or maudlin or 
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caustic. In fact, divorce is not mentioned in the piece. Nor does he blame 
or scold. Nor, for that matter, does he make any grand moral 
pronouncements about the faltering family, the sky-rocketing divorce rate, 
or any other message that is in the least bit didactic. These characteristics 
are important considerations in personal writing, for, as we have all 
experienced, unconstrained ethos can become confessional, maudlin, or 
caustic. Monahan, instead, establishes an equable ethos that shows more 
than it tells. 
I have the students first read through the piece. Then, with pens in 
hand, they underline every 111, 11 11me11 , or 11myself1 in the essay. From this 
exercise they can see the dominance of the self in writing. In 11Cold Wind 11 
the following phrases catch the eye: 
111 knew deep snow would come to the lake. 11 
111 turned inside to spoon the dogs their Science Diet. 11 
111 can see my breath in the master bedroom. 11 
''The dogs and I live downstairs in the parlor with the fireplace. 11 
11l'm cold. 11 
111 wish we could share a brandy and a five-dollar smoke. 11 
111 might simply lie down to sleep in the heaven of geese." 
"I am called back to the present. 11 
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In addition to underlining personal pronouns, students circle the first 
word of each sentence. Although the examples above would suggest an 
overuse of 11111 beginning sentences, I cite these examples out of context to 
illustrate not only the appropriateness of 11111 (many students still think it is 
illegal to use 11111 in an essay), but to show the smoothness of the style. In 
Monahan's first twenty sentences, he begins only four sentences with 111." 
I want students to see this. I also want them to see that in this essay, 
however, that he begins his last five sentences with 11111 for rhetorical effect: 
he is reasserting himself. 
Last, I ask them to discuss the writer in as much detail as possible. 
If the piece is well-written and has abundant ethos, I assert, then the 
readers should have a strong sense of the writer's self. The writer of 
"Cold Wind" has variously been described as "tough, 11 "sensitive, 11 "alone, 11 
an 11outdoorsman, 11 "depressed.'' and "contemplative." In arriving at these 
traits, the students specify how the writer projects these attributes. 
Equally important, students can see first-hand the degree of exposure the 
writer renders in revealing himself, the distance as it were that builds or not 
the barrier the writer wants. Effective personal writing should reveal, as this 
essay in point illustrates, the created ethos that the writer intends. Both 
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personality and character surface in this piece: he is, at least by group 
concensus, both personable and virtuous--and I would certainly agree. I 
thought that students responded well to this piece and that the writer 
projected the engaged ethos that elicited a favorable response. 
In contrast, another 11My Turn" piece--Chang-Lin Tien's "America's 
Scapegoats11--though personally engaged, was not as well received. 
Although I would rather speculate otherwise, I suspect that in large part the 
generally negative reaction to this piece dealt more with the writer's name 
than his ethos. But, nonetheless, we approached this piece in the same 
manner we approached "Cold Wind, 11 gleaning these elements of ethos: 
11My life has been far more satisfying than I dreamed 
possible when I arrived in the United States. 11 
11My former Ph.D. students are professors at major colleges." 
111 have watched the campaign to discourage immigration 
with growing concern." 
111 don't object to controlling the volume of immigration." 
111 am no stranger to the sharp sting of anti-immigrant 
hostility. 11 
111 am privileged to head a_ world-class institution." 
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As with all pieces, the students circled personal pronouns, paying special 
note to sentence openers. In contrast with "Cold Wind," Tien began far 
fewer sentences with 111111 although, of note, he began six sentences with 
"my." Possession permeated his ethos--appropriately enough (I thought)--
given his thesis of the tacit discrimination against natural-born Americans 
of Asian descent. When asked for their impressions of the writer--as I do 
with all pieces--students described him as a ''foreigner, 11 "arrogant, 11 
''whiney, 11 "geeky," "negative," and a "racist." When I asked them to 
substantiate their responses with specific attention to ethos, some could see 
the gap between his ethos and his message. Although my point in this 
chapter pertains more to writer- than reader-based composition, I thought 
that the students failed to see the differences in ideology between them and 
the writer--that his ethos, when isolated, projected attributes opposite to 
those that the students claimed they found. 
Although I would classify these two essays as primarily personal 
because the subject as self was the strongest mode of appeal, I approach 
argumentative essays in much the same way. What characteristics beyond 
grammar, style, and organization make an essay effective? Ethos, I 
maintain, is indeed the most pow.erful means available in persuading an 
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audience. To illustrate this point, I again refer to the 11My Turn" column, 
specifically to an essay entitled 11Brother, Don't Spare a Dime. 11 Unlike the 
previous two essays, 11Brother11 directly engages the reader with this 
provocative thesis: the homeless themselves are at fault for their poverty. 
As usual, I ask students to seek out the personal pronouns. These 
references are pronounced: 
11How can I say this? 11 
111 have led a weekly chapel service." 
"Let me qualify what I just said. 11 
"One person I worked with is a good example." 
111 will not pretend to give ultimate answers." 
"Please don't take my word for it. 11 
Students like this essay. Conservative in its content, this piece portrays an 
ethos of care and compassion, yet an ethos of experience that essentially 
supports students' predispositions to the topic of welfare. After completing 
the preliminary analyses, students view the writer as 11concerned, 1111religious, 11 
"hard working, 11 "honest, 11 and 11bold. 11 They respond, I think, less to the 
argument at hand and more to the ethos of the writer, a response that 
supports the power of the self in _composition. 
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I insisted that the students reread this piece. 
Upon closer scrutiny, this writer, though well-engaged, personable, 
and seemingly virtuous, appeared to have a hidden agenda. The students 
and I sensed a veiled voice that attacked not only the homeless, but the 
welfare system in general. This attack, we thought, though fair game, 
was deceptive in that the writer's ethos was insincere. In summary, we 
were not persuaded by this piece--the ethos rang no bells of truth. 
Of course, I realize that my own ethos and character probably 
impeded student response. And I also realize that some, if not all, of my 
students agreed with my analysis on only a surface level. Some still 
thought, I sensed, that the writer was a well-meaning person, who, though 
compassionate, who, though serving soup in the food lines in Austin, and 
who, though conducting chapel services, could not bring himself to accept 
that some people are poor for reasons beyond their control. 
Perhaps these students were right. But my point is that ethos is an 
abstract quality--visible through grammatical references--yet evasive 
otherwise. Some essays can crackle with personality--a less judgmental 
aspect of ethos; and some essays can capture character--a less definable 
trait. Ideally, ethos should disclose both personality and character in the 
conveyance of effective composition. 
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Thus far in this chapter I have discussed my general approach to the 
teaching of composition. Part philosophic, part practical, my teaching, 
for better or for worse, focuses on the writer--the ethos of the personality 
and/or character that should surface in a paper. 
In conclusion to this chapter, I will briefly discuss some students' 
samples that I have collected during the semester. Although these essays 
are not necessarily the best or the worst that have come across my desk, 
they do illustrate the range of ethos that I see emerge. And although I 
would like to categorize with finality levels or types of ethos, I find it a nearly 
impossible task. Some papers talk and others do not. I will, however, label 
my examples as "strong ethos," "fair ethos," and "no ethos." 
My criteria for such determination is similar to the criteria that we as a class 
apply to the theory and to the examples that we study. 
'Words Downrange" expresses both personality and character. The 
writer, discussing his composing rituals, compares writing with shooting: 
"Like a sharpshooter settling down on the 500-yard line, I go to the 
desk and sit. I look downrange at my target--clean white paper ... no 
damage yet." Additionally, the writer sustains his engagement: "I 
carefully and methodically fire off_ my thoughts;" "I often sit in my 
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antique barber chair at home, prop my boots up on the swiveling foot-
rest, lean the seat back ... and get nothing;" "It is important that a 
man have a voice, or he is not a man;" 111 enjoy writing." 
This piece reads well. The ethos is strong, revealing both personality 
and character. His images suggest a rural person--the boots and guns. 
And the implicit character that emerges is one of strength and discipline. 
Another essay, "The American Dream Blown Away." though not as 
stylistically sharp as "Downrange, 11 is nonetheless strongly engaged. 
This writer, talking about gun control, tells the following anecdote: 
Friday night was all calm. My mother was in the 
kitchen frying chicken. My father was up to his 
usual routine. After work he would flop his dust-
filled shirt across the porch swing and head straight 
for the shower. Then his ritual consisted of preparing 
his hunting apparel.. .. Curious, I reached for the rifle .... 
My mother started toward me and was condemning children 
having guns when my father said, "don't worry, it is not 
loaded. She backed up with a disgusted look about her. 
I lifted the gun, pointed it at her, and muttered 'bang, 
bang.' The third bang was real.. .. l looked and saw my 
father crouched over my mother. 
This personal anecdote, I thought, was compelling. Convincingly, 
through the power of his ethos, the writer wrote a solid paper about the 
need for gun control. Although with this passage I find it difficult to 
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determine personality or character (unlike with the first piece), I would 
commend the writer's ethos as it is established from his perspective as 
a child. The balance of the paper, I might add, '!flattens out11 in that 
his ethos disappears with such typical statements as 11self protection 
is what motivates most people to purchase a gun, 11 or 11the crime rate is 
higher than ever and violence has become a normal way of life in today's 
society. 11 Clearly, however, his introductory anecdote is an example of 
strong ethos. 
Another student, advocating unrestricted pornography, entitled her 
piece 11More Than Tits, 11 which I found engaging and eye-catching. 
Beginning her essay with this sentence--"As a married college student, I 
have encountered a dilemma involving Oklahoma's regulation of 
pornography11-- the writer proceeds to establish her own perspective and 
authority on the issue. Concluding her introduction with this sentence--
'While our neighboring states drink six-point beer and watch arousing porn 
flicks, we [in Oklahoma] listen to the bellowing of hypocritical fat old women 
who never smile11--the writer makes a fairly good case about existing laws. 
-
This writer's ethos--at least her personality--bristles throughout the piece. 
Ethos as character, as I have said, is a tougher entity to capture. Al-
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though I personally commend her audacity, others may find such ethos 
offensive. Like the previous two essays, I would classify this essay as 
projecting a strong ethos. 
Other essays, essays that I would classify as having a fairly involved 
ethos, contain generally the semblance of ethos-the use of personal 
pronouns--but little engagement. For example, an essay entitled 
"Stressed Out'' discusses ''the nervous society in which we live. 11 Beginning 
her essay by saying, 111 fell for it, too--the theory that stress is ruining our 
lives, 11 the writer proceeds to efface her ethos as the essay proceeds. 
Although she makes such statements as 111 honestly believe that we make 
too much of our problems, 11 little else is revealed about the writer or her 
ability to cope with stress. Little is disclosed about the writer and her 
involvement with her thesis. No where, for instance, does the writer talk 
about her bouts with anxiety attacks, or about a physical or emotional 
breakdown that may have caused her to reexamine her life. I am not sug-
gesting that writers must disclose personal aspects of their lives, but I am 
suggesting that given their topics of choice they should include a strong 
dose of themselves. 
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My last classification--no ethos--is familiar, I think, to most readers. 
These papers, I suppose, may have a voice hovering above the piece, but 
I would say they are totally void of personality or character. On the 
grammatical surface, these papers have no personal pronouns, nor, from 
my perspective, do they in any other way convey the engagement that 
ethos requires. A typical example is an essay entitled "The HIV 
Infected Surgeon." I find the title alone distanced and uninviting, and I 
shuffle such papers to the bottom of the stack. The writer, beginning his 
paper with this line--11Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is one 
of the most controversial issues in today's modern society11--proceeds to 
vaguely drone on about "healthcare workers who are especially worried 
because they are exposed more than the rest of the population." True, I 
suppose, but what is the writer's engagement in this piece? He has none, 
and because of this complete lack of ethos the paper is ineffective. Other 
similar papers abound. I am pleased, however, that I receive fewer and 
fewer of these types of papers. For whatever other flaws I have in the 
classroom--and they are many--getting writers to engage themselves is 
becoming less of one. 
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Ethos in my classroom prevails. This emphasis, of course, does not 
diminish the importance of good grammar, mechanics, style, and structure. 
I have found, to the contrary, that good ethos promotes the principles 
of current-traditional rhetoric. When students have a voice that conveys 
something of essence to an audience, I find that their writing improves 
in all areas. 
Chapter VI 
Conclusion: Future Directions 
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Ah say ... Ah say. Ah hate writin'! Ah always seems to mess somethin' up. 
Foghorn the Rooster 
This dissertation has surveyed the evolution of ethos from its 
classical roots through poststructuralism. Regardless of the gaps, 
contradictions, or errors of thought it may entail, I have found that writing 
about writing to an audience primarily of writers has been an unusually 
self-conscious act, made even more so by the discussion of the self in 
the larger field of rhetoric. 
Ethos is problematic. On the one hand, it is an ethereal entity that 
bobs and weaves its way through a piece of discourse--a voice 
whispering to escape the confines of linguistic symbols. On the other 
hand, it is a concrete presence identified through the grammar of "I" that 
asserts the writer's presence. But composition, as discussed in this 
work, has not been defined as a private act of committing one's thoughts 
to paper for the purpose of self revelation or for the discovery of ideas. 
Clearly though, as I have implied throughout, ethos aligns itself with the 
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task of invention, and this discovery of self enhances composition--
composition that must turn outward in communicating to another person. 
Writing must begin with the self. Jim Corder sums up the centeredness 
of the writer with this apt metaphor: 
Each of us is the center of some small geography, if only 
because we see with our own eyes and hear with our own 
ears. If north is up and south is down and east is over and 
west is out, then the center of the landscape is someone's 
bellybutton (305). 
I, the writer, can only speak from my own perspective, as limited and 
distorted as my view may be. Though I have borrowed voraciously from 
others, this piece is mine, and I have asserted myself in ways of my own 
choosing, ways that include invention, arrangement, and style. This 
awareness compels me to conclude that we need to liberate writers from 
the constraints of any brand of rhetoric that ignores the writer by 
emphasizing content, grammar, and mechanics. 
In this regard, I believe that ethos, largely ignored in the past 
century, will revive itself in our efforts to render--and not only explain--
experiences both of ourselves and the world around us. The next 
millennium will require, I think, forceful, creative thinkers and writers who 
can no longer afford the timidity of expression that the exclusion of ethos 
in rhetoric causes. Effectiveness, more than correctness, will better 
tackle the challenges that confront us. 
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Composition, like its literary counterpart, mirrors the social, cultural, 
and political milieu in which it is written. The rise of the current-
traditional paradigm, with its emphasis on correctness, parallels the 
exactitude of the scientific and corporate thinking that has prevailed one 
hundred years. People, in general, became secondary to the ideas they 
expressed. Einstein, for instance, could communicate with complete 
objectivity his theory of relativity, but avoided any personal commentary 
on the human ramifications of his discoveries. 
Likewise, thinkers in other fields utilized the preciseness of 
objectivity, the crispness of a barren style, and the tightness of a rigid 
structure to distinguish their writing-all attributes of the current-traditional 
model of writing that still dominates composition classrooms today. 
These features--correctness, precision, and organization--are, of course, 
admirable goals of effective writing, and enhance the thesis of this paper: 
the emergence of the self in writing. 
Writing has prevailed over the writer, and correctness has prevailed 
over effectiveness. The current-traditional model of writing, predicated 
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on the assumption that knowledge is "out there" to be captured on 
paper, will ultimately run its course in its ability to generate new ideas for 
the problems that plague society. Only so much, I would argue, can be 
captured. The rest, I assert, must be discovered. And this discovery 
hinges on the liberation of ethos in rhetoric. 
This liberation of ethos, I realize, is nothing new in the history of 
rhetoric. Our discipline, as I have noted throughout, has classical roots 
that we tend to rediscover as the occasion warrants, or, in more scientific 
terms, as the paradigm shifts. Maxine Hairston summarizes this shift as 
follows: 
I think that the people who do most 
to promote a static and unexamined 
approach to teaching writing are those 
who define writing courses as. service 
and skills courses .... Such a view, which 
denies that writing requires intellectual 
activity and ignores the importance of 
writing as a basic method of learning, 
takes away any incentive for the writing 
teacher to grow professionally (79). 
Here lies our challenge. We as writing teachers must first change 
our methods before we can expect our students to change. Steeped as 
we are in the paradigm of current-traditional rhetoric, we cannot help but 
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see ourselves as trainers whose task it is to polish skills for students who 
view writing as a practical means of communicating knowledge in their 
respective fields. We should not train; we should educate. Students 
mirror our emphases. We must take charge of our own discipline, and, 
in doing so, begin asking ourselves why our students are writing the kind 
of 11pretzel prose11 that Elbow bemoans, or why our students cannot 
establish their rhetorical stance that Booth promotes, or why our students 
have no knowledge of the classical tradition that Corbett espouses. Or 
why, as the deconstructionist movement has informed us, we make such 
needless distinctions between reading and writing, asserting that they are 
opposite sides of the same coin and ignoring the poststructural truth that 
to construct (write) is to deconstruct (read). 
We must continue to insist that writing have a point, that it be 
structured, and that it be correct. Dull, static, lifeless prose may not 
excite the imagination, may not project the essence of a living, breathing 
writer, and may not crackle with the stylistic nuances of a sophisticated 
sentence, but it serves a purpose and remains an admirable objective. 
Not all students, not all people, want or need the ready pen anxious to 
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discover, to reveal, or to communicate original ideas that will alter the 
reader's version of reality. To suggest otherwise is arrogant and elitist. 
For the majority of our students who trudge across the required 
landscape called composition, writing is a chore. Though we would like 
to think otherwise, they see us as assigners of tasks to be done, who, 
once they have performed the motion of busywork, probably done in one 
fell swoop the night before, submit to us words to be graded. They 
expect the red marks and the grade at the bottom and consider the job 
done at that point. Subsequent essays are written in the same way 1 
each being a separate and terminal task of composing the easiest and 
safest piece possible. This security means clinging to the basic, 
standard organization of introduction, main body, and conclusion. 
This fear of exposure, this apprehension of the inner-
consciousness turned outward, is, I suspect, one of the major 
impediments that novice--and even accomplished--writers encounter. 
Our students fear exposure of selves: ethos. 
As Berlin, Elbow, Murray, and a host of others, myself included, 
have urged, we must stress ethos in writing for those who strive for 
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effective prose. Students must express personality and character in the 
projection of themselves as a central means of appeal to an audience. 
We are not teaching experienced essayists who wish to refine their 
craft. We are instead teaching inexperienced students who find difficulty 
in moving their pens across an empty sheet of paper, much less in 
exposing themselves to strangers called teachers. For those of us not at 
the vanguard of innovative thought who want instead to write in straight 
lines with a steady hand, current-traditional rhetoric and its 
emphases on arrangement and style can well serve the writing needs of 
most students. Correct writing is preferable to incorrect writing. 
This current-traditional emphasis essentially concludes a college 
Freshman Composition I course. Composition II courses and beyond 
must stress thinking that expands the limits of correctness, and such 
venturing requires the discovery of self and the values that underlie the 
individual writer. Ethos, from its classical origins to its modern 
interpretations, must emerge as the dominating force in effective writing. 
Our future direction is clouded by an array of competing versions 
as to how writing should be learned and taught. I believe first that 
composition teachers must be rhetoricians. This nomenclature entails 
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the assumption that the best practice is good theory, and that good 
theory is rooted in the classical rhetoricians. This distinction further 
entails the academic rigor of tracing our roots from the classical 
foundation to the "rhetorical renaissance" of 1963. It further entails our 
ability to form consensus--rather than to provoke differences--about what 
constitutes good writing, about, as Aristotle said, 11of discovering all the 
available means of persuasion." 
These challenges, however, come from within. We can, in large 
part, seize and maintain control of our own discipline, knowing as we do 
the wide scope of differences that should unite rather than divide us. 
From these inside challenges I see much promise. Within our diversity I 
believe that we can forge ahead, demanding from our students that they 
reexamine themselves and the world around them. My optimism, in this 
respect, exceeds that of Stephen North, who, in his The Making of 
Knowledge in Composition, predicts that either "composition as we know 
it will essentially disappear ... or that it might survive, but probably only by 
breaking its institutional ties with literary studies and, hence, English 
departments" (373). I see neither the disappearance of our discipline or 
the severance of our ties with our literary counterparts. 
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Literary and rhetoric scholars draw from the same well of 
knowledge, and each enhances the other; we are, by history, separate in 
consciousness yet of the same mind. Literary studies promote better 
writing, and better writing promotes better literature. Rather than seeing 
as North does a separation of composition and literature studies, I 
foresee, as current evidence already suggests, a merging and mutual 
respect of the two disciplines. Poststructural theory abounds with critical 
similarities, as was discussed in Chapter Four. 
Ethos should remain at the forefront of our future. Just as 
literature is defined by where it focuses the writer's reality, so too does 
rhetoric make the same claim. And this nexus of reality remains with the 
writer-~writing has been and will remain a manifestation of the self in 
which language, for all its flaws, is the medium of communication 
between the self and others. Writing must begin with the self and then 
turn outward. 
Writing, ideally, should begin at our own geographic centers and 
travel outward in our efforts to better define ourselves and the world we 
inhabit. Ethos lies at the core of effective writing. 
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